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Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, 
Complex Choices 
ALICE G. ABREU* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If taxes had existed in the Garden of Eden, the serpent would not have 
needed an apple; the promise of a simpler tax system alone would have 
seduced Eve. The promise of a simpler tax system now threatens to 
seduce the American people, and has become a dominant theme of both 
congressional and presidential politics in the 1990's. 1 In its current 
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much that is tangled in the world of taxes. I am grateful for the care and thoughtfulness 
with which Rob Bartow, Rick Greenstein, Nancy Knauer, and Marty McMahon read and 
commented on prior drafts, and for the incomparable research assistance of A. Christina 
Derry and Ivy Barton-Wagner, Temple '97, as well as for the unflagging dependability 
of John Necci, Assistant Library Director of the Temple Law School Library. A 
Summer Research Stipend from Temple University School of Law provided financial 
support for this project, but all of the views expressed here, and any errors, are mine 
alone. 
1. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENVER L. REV. 329 
(1996); Bill Bradley, It's Government by Tax Break Again; Clinton and Dole Should be 
Talking About Fairness and Loopholes, Not Cuts and Credits, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 
29, 1996, at Cl (stating that simplicity and equity in a tax system are possible, but not 
from the flat tax, which benefits only the wealthy); David Gergen, The Flat-tax 
Diversion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 5, 1996, at 80 (criticizing politicians' 
emphasis on promoting flat tax as a cure-all); Howard Gleckman & Mike McNamee, The 
Flat Tax May Be Back. Right, Bob?, BUSINESS WEEK, June 10, 1996, at 34 (discussing 
potential effects of Bob Dole's flat tax plan); Robert S. McIntyre, Flat on our Backs (flat 
tax proposals), THE NATION, Feb. 12, 1996, at 5 (identifying simplification as seductive, 
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incarnation, the promise of a simpler tax system has taken the form of 
various proposals for a ":flat" tax.2 Perhaps because :flatness is dull, we 
assume it to be simple. 3 
The :flatness of the proposed :flat tax derives from its rate structure and 
is intended to provide a contrast to the progressive rate structure that has 
been the hallmark of the federal income tax since its inception. A tax 
system with a single positive rate appears simpler than one that is 
graduated, with multiple rate brackets. Appearances can be deceiving, 
however, and in this case they are dangerously so. The appearance of 
simplicity projected by a tax system that boasts a completely or 
relatively :flat rate structure is deceiving because an analysis of the rate 
structure alone tells us only one of the things we need to know to 
evaluate a tax system: the rate of taxation. While the rate of taxation 
is an important feature of any tax system, a complete analysis must 
consider not only the rate itself but also the base to which that rate 
applies. It is meaningless to say that the rate of tax is, say, twenty 
percent, without also saying what it is twenty percent of.4 If the devil 
is in the details, then the tax base is the devil in any tax system, for the 
complexity of a tax system is generally proportional to the difficulty of 
determining its base. Under the current income tax system, it is arriving 
at taxable income that is difficult, not multiplying taxable income by the 
applicable rate.5 
but deceptive, hook to most Americans); Alison Mitchell, Attack and Parry: Taxes Set 
Political Pace, THE N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at 9 (reporting that "Dole advisor said 
that the across-the-board tax reduction 'would be politically attractive because it's the 
kind of thing that can attract attention and seize the imagination'" of voters); Katharine 
Q. Seelye, Shifting Campaign Strategy to Tax Cutting, Dole Meets with Forbes, THE 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at Bl 1 (explaining Bob Dole's plan for a "single-rate 
income tax"); Mark Sherman, Candidates' Mantra: Simpler Tax Code, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Feb. 2, 1996, at B3 (discussing presidential candidates' use of flat tax slogans). 
2. See Bank, supra note 1, at 329-32; Ernest S. Christian, The Tax Restructuring 
Phenomenon: Analytical Principles and Political Equations, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 373 
(1995); David Sachs, Variations on a Theme by DickArmey-A Framework/or Real Tax 
Simplification, 66 TAX NOTES 863 (1995). 
3. The word "flat" is defined not only as horizontally level and lacking in 
inequalities of surface, but also as uninteresting, dull, tedious, stale, tasteless, or insipid 
(as in flat beer or food), pointless (as a joke that falls flat), commercially dull (as a flat 
market), without gloss, and not clear, sharp or ringing (as a flat voice). In music, a note 
lowered half a step in pitch is a flat, as is one that is below an intended pitch. THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 460-61 (1955). 
4. Happily, Professor Graetz has eloquently made this point to those who need 
to hear it most: the members of the Senate Finance Committee. Current Flat Tax 
Proposals, testimony of Michael J. Graetz presented at hearings before the Senate 
Finance Committee on May 18, 1995, reprinted in 67 TAX NOTES 1256, 1257 (1995) 
[hereinafter Graetz Testimony]. . 
5. The social security tax system is simple not because it contains a single rate 
but because it has an easily definable base--wages from employment. Indeed, whatever 
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Analysis of the tax base also tells us much that is important in 
evaluating a tax system: It tells us who bears the burden of taxation and 
who has the power to avoid taxation or to shift its economic incidence. 
I have previously suggested that tax· systems should be evaluated not 
only on the basis of what they take away from people, but also on the 
basis of what they give people. Depending on how they are designed, 
tax systems can give people varying degrees of power to avoid their 
imposition ("avoidance power"), or to shift the economic burden they 
impose ("burden power").6 The current tax system provides significant 
amounts of both types of power and allocates that power primarily to the 
holders of material capital.7 Both the grant and allocation of avoidance 
power and burden power reflect values-in this case, the value of 
personal autonomy and the value of the ownership of material capital. 
The adoption of a tax system that gives people the power to alter their 
tax liability by altering their behavior reflects the value of personal 
autonomy because such a system empowers people. People who are 
empowered feel a sense of personal autonomy because empowerment 
allows them to feel that they are in control of their lives. Assuming 
empowerment is good, empowering primarily those who own material 
capital reflects the high value placed on the ownership of material 
capital.8 
Empowerment analysis can illuminate the current tax reform debate. 
Applying the concepts of avoidance power and burden power to the 
current tax reform debate offers a number of insights. First, it reveals 
that tax systems which produce equivalent economic effects can produce 
starkly different allocations of power. Those allocations of power ought 
to be considered as the policy debate continues. Second, it shows that 
the simpler the system, the less power it confers. Gains in simplicity 
should therefore be weighed against losses in power, and the values 
complexity exists in that system is directly attributable to the difficulty of determining 
the base--that is, determining precisely when it is that someone is employed. It is the 
difficulty of making that determination that has led to the controversy over independent 
contractor status. 
6. Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1, 12 (1996). 
7. Id. at 35-37, 71, 75. 
8. Although empowerment is not always good for a variety of reasons, which I 
have discussed at length in Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, supra note 
6, I have concluded that, in matters involving taxation, power is generally perceived as 
good by those who have it. Id. at 12, 50-54. 
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implicit in bestowing any remaining power on specific classes of people 
should be carefully scrutinized. Third and most important, this analysis 
shows that measures calculated to increase savings can empower 
different categories of people. Savings can be increased by measures 
that empower primarily the holders of material capital or by measures 
that do not provide additional power to the holders of material capital 
but instead make it easier for providers of labor to become holders of 
material capital. Before adopting or enhancing either type of measure, 
the resulting allocations of power ought to be considered. 
Part II of this Article outlines the salient features of the two tax reform 
proposals that have received serious scholarly and political attention: the 
proposal introduced by United States Representative Armey as the 
Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, which I will refer to as 
the Armey Flat Tax,9 and the proposal introduced by Senators 
Domenici, Nunn, and Kerrey as the USA Tax Act of 1995,10 which I 
will refer to as the Nunn-Domenici Tax.11 Part III considers the degree 
9. 141 CONG. REC. El46-0l (July 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Armey); see also. 
Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) 
[hereinafter Armey Flat Tax]. Senator Shelby (R-Ala) also introduced a companion bill 
in the Senate. 141 CONG. REc. Sl0320-04 (July 19, 1995) (statement of Sen. Shelby; 
see also Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(July 19, 1995). I have chosen to refer to Representative Armey's proposal as the 
Armey Flat Tax to distinguish it from other flat tax proposals that have been made either 
by scholars or by other politicians. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text, for 
a discussion of other flat tax proposals. For a good compendium of the bills introduced 
and the amount of serious political attention the idea of a flat tax has received, see, 
Bank, supra note I, at 329-32; William L. Raby and Burgess J. W. Raby, Will the Flat 
Tax Kill Tax Practice? 71 TAX NOTES 1269 (1996); Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 1995) 30-31, 38 [hereinafter JCT Pamphlet]. 
10. USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter 
Nunn-Domenici Tax]. Although the rate structure of the Nunn-Domenici Tax is flat as 
it applies to business income, it is not flat at all as it applies to the income of 
individuals. See infra note 58 for a description of the rate structure of the Nunn-
Domenici Tax on individuals. 
11. Much of the recent scholarship on tax reform also focuses on the Armey Flat 
Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. OLIVER, WHY WE SHOULD 
ABOLISH THE INCOME TAX-A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPAL PROPOSALS 105-15 (1995); 
Christian, supra note 2; JCT Pamphlet, supra note 9, at 30-31, 38; Michael J. Calegari 
et al., Flat Tax Ramifications/or Self-Employed Taxpayers, 72 TAX NOTES 641 (1996); 
N. Jerold Cohen and Robert Hall, The Flat Tax: Is it an Idea Whose Time has come?, 
82 AB.A. J. 82 (1996); Heidi Glenn, Flat Tax Would Sting Low-Income Families, Study 
Finds, 72 TAX NOTES 275 (1996); Amy Hamilton, Treasury Official Discusses How 
Federal Reform Could Impact States, 70 TAX NOTES 805 (1996); John S. Nolan, The 
Merit of an Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 71 TAX NOTES 805 (1996); Fred 
Stokeld, AICP A Releases Study Urging Caution In Moving Toward Consumption Tax, 
70 TAX NOTES 141 (1996); Martin A. Sullivan, The Ultimate Flat Tax And Other Daring 
Ideas, 72 TAX NOTES 1057 (1996); Martin A. Sullivan, Housing and the Flat Tax: 
Visible Pain, Subtle Benefits, 70 TAX NOTES 340 (1996); Eric Toder, Comments on 
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of avoidance power conferred by each proposal, and Part IV considers 
the degree of burden power conferred by each proposal. Part V 
concludes with some observations regarding the values implicated by the 
distribution of power each proposal would produce. Readers already 
familiar with the details of the two proposals may want to skip Part II. 
II. THE TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 
A. The Armey Flat Tax 
· The Armey Flat Tax descends from the seminal work of two Hoover 
Institution Fellows, Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, who popularized 
the concept of a flat tax in 1981 and then published a book entitled The 
Flat Tax in 1985.12 The Hall and Rabushka flat tax has been the 
centerpiece of several political campaigns, including the 1996 presiden-
tial primary campaigns of Malcolm S. Forbes Jr. and Senator Arlen 
Specter, and the 1992 senatorial campaign of Bruce Herschensohn. 13 
Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 66 TAX NOTES 2003 (1995). I have decided 
to refer to the USA Tax Act of 1995 as the Nunn-Domenici Tax primarily because that 
is how it is referred to most often. The central ideas of the Armey Flat Tax and the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax were also prominent features of the Kemp Report. National 
Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, Unleashing America's Potential-A 
Pro-growth, Pro-family Tax System for the 21st Century, 70 TAX NOTES 413 (1996). 
Neither the Armey Flat Tax nor the Nunn-Domenici Tax purport to replace the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code"). Instead, both purport to amend it. See, e.g., 
Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § 101; see also Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, 
§ 201(a). 
12. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1985). See also, 
James M. Bickley, Flat Tax: An Overview of the Hall-Rabushka Proposal, 72 TAX 
NOTES 97, 98 (1996); JCT Pamphlet, supra note 9, at 31 n.39. A second edition of Hall 
and Rabushka's book, updated to reflect the endorsement of the initial concept by 
various legislators, including Representative Armey, was published 10 years later, in 
1995. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter 
THE FLAT TAX]. The second edition was also updated to reflect the enactment of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and includes a new chapter of questions and answers. All 
references to THE FLAT TAX in this Article are to the second edition. 
13. THE FLAT TAX, supra note 12. The 104th Congress has seen the introduction 
of at least seven bills that would · enact some version of the flat tax. See, James M. 
Bickley, Flat Tax, supra note 12, at 98. See, e.g., Community Renewal and Economic 
Opportunity Act, S. 1533, 104th Cong. (1996) (Sen. McCain); Flat Tax Act of 1995, S. 
1038, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sen. Helms); S. 488, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sen. Specter); 
Creative Revenues Act of 1995, H.R. 2526, 104th Cong. (1995) (Rep. Owens); National 
VOICE on a Flat Tax and Cap on Tax Increases Act of 1995, H.R. 2116, 104th Cong. 
(1995) (Rep. Hoekstra); H.R. 1780, 104th Cong. (1995) (Rep. Souder); Crane Tithe Tax 
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Although The Flat Tax includes a model statute, I have chosen to focus 
on the Armey Flat Tax rather than on Hall and Rabushka's model statute 
because, of the two, only the Armey Flat Tax stands any chance of 
actually becoming law, at least until someone introduces Hall and 
Rabushka's model statute as proposed legislation in Congress. 14 
The contrast between the current federal income tax system and the 
Armey Flat Tax is stark. The systems differ not only because they 
attempt to tax different things but because the differences in their design 
cause them to provide different amounts of information to the taxpaying 
public as well as starkly different opportunities for the exercise of 
taxpayer choice. 
Act of 1995, H.R. 214, 104th Cong. (1995) (Rep. Crane). · The 103rd Congress•also 
witnessed the introduction of various flat tax proposals. See, e.g., Flat Tax Act of 1993, 
S. 193, 103d Cong. (1993) (Sen. Helms); Flat Tax Act of 1993, S. 188, 103d Cong. 
(1993) (Sen. Helms); Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1994, H.R. 4585, 103d 
Cong. (1994) (Rep. Armey); Crane Tithe Act of 1993, H.R. 1190, 103d Cong. (1993) 
(Rep. Crane). Out of all of these proposals, only the Armey proposal has received 
sustained and serious attention, and I have therefore chosen to focus my discussion on 
it. I will not discuss the flat tax so stridently advocated by Malcolm "Steve" Forbes 
during his bid for the Republican Presidential Nomination because it never existed as a 
serious legislative proposal. For an explanation and discussion of the proposal, see An 
Inte111iew With Steve Forbes, 72 TAX NOTES 165 (1996). Subsequent to his defeat in 
his quest for the nomination, Forbes joined forces with Representative Armey and 
continued to argue publicly for a flat tax. See Louis Lyons, GOP Set to Make Tax 
Reform Central Campaign Issue, 72 TAX NOTES 277 (1996). 
14. That is highly unlikely because Hall and Rabushka's model statute is just not 
administrable. Hall and Rabushka's model statute contains a mere eight sections that set 
forth the structure of the tax in minimalist terms perfectly suited to their purpose. That 
minimalist statute could never produce a workable tax system, however. For example, 
the provision on exempt organizations provides, in its entirety, as follows: 
Organizations exempt from the business tax are[:] 
(1) State and local governments, and their subsidiary units[;] 
(2) Educational, religious, charitable, philanthropic, cultural, and community 
service organizations that do not return income to individual and corporate 
owners. 
THE FLAT TAX, supra note 12, at 145. Even so staunch a supporter of the flat tax as 
Mr. Armey recognized the impossibility of administering a system with so little 
definition, and the Armey Flat Tax not only retains all of the provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code that are necessary to determine whether "an organization is exempt from 
tax," but adds an entire, substantially complicated, provision that imposes an additional 
tax on non-cash compensation provided to employees of exempt organizations. Armey 
Flat Tax, supra note 9, § 106(b)(2)(B)(ii); see id. § 102(b) (adding section 4977 to the 
present Code). The purpose of the provision is apparently to ensure that fringe benefits, 
which would not be included in the income of employees under the general definition 
of income in the proposal (see infra note 22), but would generally be subject to tax at 
the business level because they are not deductible to employers (see infra text 
accompanying note 53), are taxed at the business level. Proposed section 4977 would 
thus equalize the tax treatment of non-cash compensation as between exempt and non-
exempt entities by ensuring that such compensation is taxable at the entity level in both 
cases. 
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Designers of tax systems who seek to achieve particular policy 
objectives have at least two fundamental options. One option is to 
design the system so that it starts with a bro1:1d base, which is then 
narrowed through the mechanism of exclusions or deductions to achieve 
the desired policy objective. The other option is to achieve the desired 
policy objectives by beginning with a base defined so narrowly that few 
exclusions and deductions are necessary to arrive at taxable income. 
Designers of the current federal income tax system chose the first 
option. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines gross 
income, is broad indeed. 15 Even lawyers who hated the course in 
federal income taxation are likely to remember the broad and unhelpful 
definition of income provided in the statute. Section 61 defines income 
as "all income from whatever source derived,"16 leaving to judicial and 
administrative construction the task of defining precisely what income 
is. Judicial intervention has not served to narrow the definition, and the 
Supreme Court, which initially defined income as "the gain from capital, 
from labor, or from both combined,"17 later expanded that definition to 
include all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion."18 The broad base created by the 
expansiveness of the judicial definition of income is narrowed only 
through statutory exclusions and deductions which set the contours of 
the tax base. 
Designers of the Armey Flat Tax have chosen the second option. The 
Armey Flat Tax defines income very narrowly, particularly for individu-
als, but also for businesses. The narrow definition of income results in 
the need for few deductions and exclusions. It is the absence of 
multitudinous deductions that most contributes to the illusion of 
simplicity. Pages upon pages of forms are not necessary since a 
taxpayer will not have any items which might be subtracted before 
15. I.RC. § 61 (West 1996). 
16. Id. 
17. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,207 (1919) (citing Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. 
Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1917)). 
18. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,431 (1954). 
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arriving at the figure to be taxed. 19 Since not much enters the base in 
the first place, not much needs to be taken out.20 
The Armey Flat Tax would place a tax of 17% on the taxable income 
of every individual and on the business taxable income of "every person 
engaged in a business activity."21 It represents a radical departure from 
the current federal income tax system not only because it provides for 
only one rate of tax but also because its definition of taxable income 
bears as much resemblance to the Code's definition of that term as a 
canoe bears to an ocean liner. 
Under the Armey Flat Tax, taxable income for individual taxpayers 
consists essentially of cash wages received for services performed in the 
United States minus a standard deduction.22 That's it. It seems simple. 
It's a canoe. 
19. Hall and Rabushka have noted that in 1994, the Service published about 480 
forms, 280 publications explaining the forms and the tax system, and sent out about 
eight billion pages of forms and instructions a year, which, placed ena to end, would 
stretch 694,000 miles. THE FLAT TAX, supra note 12, at 5. They note that such mileage 
is enough to go around the earth twenty-eight times and accounts for the destruction of 
293,760 trees, thus also allowing them to make an environmental claim for the virtues 
of the flat tax they propose. Id. That mileage is also enough to go to the moon and 
back, (the centers of the earth and moon are 238,857 miles apart), which would also 
allow them to claim that the tax system that generates it ought to go the way of the 
NASA program of travel to the moon. 
20. The Armey Flat Tax might also be thought to be simpler than the current 
system because it appears to eliminate the need to distinguish between ordinary income 
and capital gain, a distinction often faulted for much of the complexity of the current 
system. As I discuss in more detail in Part V, infra, any such elimination is illusory. 
By distinguishing between "gross active income," which is taxable, and other types of 
income derived by business, which are not, the Armey Flat Tax preserves the need to 
distinguish between the fruits of ordinary business activity ( ordinary income under the 
current system) and returns on investment (capital gains under the current system). 
Conceptually, taxing one kind of income and not taxing another kind of income is no 
simpler than taxing one kind of income at one rate and another kind of income at 
another rate. Not taxing income is itself a rate, albeit a zero rate. 
21. Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, §§ lOl(a), 102(a). The Armey Flat Tax calls 
for a rate of 20% during the first year it is effective, dropping to a rate of 17% 
thereafter. Id. 
22. Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § lOl(b) (amending I.R.C. § 63). The proposal 
also includes two items that can be regarded as substitutes for cash wages: retirement 
distributions and unemployment compensation. Id. The Armey Flat Tax defines 
retirement distributions as distributions from a plan described in section 401(a) of the 
Code, an annuity plan described in section 403(a) of the Code, an annuity contract 
described in section 403(b) of the Code, an individual retirement account described in 
section 408(a) of the Code, and individual retirement annuity described in section 408(b) 
of the Code, an eligible defined compensation plan as defined in section 457 of the 
Code, a governmental plan defined in section 414(d) of the Code, a trust described in 
section 50l(c)(18) of the Code, and, in a sentence that proves that even in the world of 
tax reform, plus 9a change, plus c 'est la meme chose, "any plan, contract, account, 
annuity, or trust which, at any time, has been determined by the Secretary to be such a 
plan, contract, account, annuity or trust." Id. 
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The definition of business taxable income is only somewhat more 
complicated. The Anney Flat Tax defines business taxable income as 
gross active income reduced by certain deductions.23 Gross active 
income is defined as gross receipts from: (1) the sale or exchange of 
property or services within the United States in connection with a 
business activity and (2) the export of property or services from the 
United States in connection with a business activity.24 The available 
deductions are limited to the cost of business inputs, wages paid in cash 
for services performed within the United States, and retirement 
contributions.25 The cost of business inputs consists of the amount paid 
for property sold or used in connection with a business activity, the 
amount paid for services (other than the services of employees), and 
excise or similar taxes imposed on the purchase of property or servic-
es.26 This definition is a canoe, too. 
The Anney Flat Tax differs from the current system not only in its 
design but also in what it subjects to taxation. Although the proposal 
uses the term "income," and the tax it imposes is on taxable income, the 
Armey Flat Tax is, in the estimation of many, including Hall and 
Rabushka, not principally an income tax at all. It is principally a 
consumption tax.27 The Armey Flat Tax would impose a consumption 
tax not because of what it taxes, but because of what it does not tax.28 
23. Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § 102(a) (amending I.R.C. § ll(c)). 
24. Id. (amending I.R.C. § 1 l(c)(2)). 
25. Id. (amending I.R.C. § 1 l(d)(l)). 
26. Id. (amending I.R.C. § 1 l(d)(2)(A)). 
27. Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A Simple, Progressive 
Consumption Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27, 28 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) 
[hereinafter FRONTIERS IN TAX REFORM]; John J. Motley III, Consumption Taxes-No 
Cure/or What Ails Us, 71 TAX NOTES 1235 (1996); J. D. Foster, Fixing the Flat Tax, 
70 TAX NOTES 1695 (1996); Gene Steuerle, The Simple Arithmetic of Flat Taxes, 70 
TAX NOTES 1041 (1996); Karen C. Burke, VATs and Flat Taxes Reconsidered, 70 TAX 
NOTES 899 (1996); JCT Pamphlet, supra note 9; MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CHANGING 
AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE (1996); Eric Toder, Comments on 
Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 66 TAX NOTES 2003 (1995); Graetz Testimony, 
supra note 4. 
28. Whether such a tax would be constitutionally permissible given that it is likely 
to be judged a direct tax (at least it is so judged by economists, see Charles E. McLure 
Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to the Direct Taxation of Consumption, 
in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 27, at 70-71, 86-88), is an open question, 
complete exploration of which is beyond the scope of this Article. Preliminary thoughts 
suggest that both the Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax should pass 
constitutional muster even if adjudged to be direct taxes, for the same reason the current 
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The signal difference between income and consumption taxes, at least in 
the current tax reform debate, is that while income taxes tax the return 
tax system appears to pass constitutional muster: They are really hybrid taxes that have 
consumption tax features but that do not tax more than income. 
That the current system is a hybrid (principally because of its failure to tax savings 
invested through employer-sponsored pension plans) is well known. See, e.g., DAVID 
F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 7, 28 (1986); DAVID F. BRADFORD, 
UNEASY COMPROMISE-PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 1-3 
(Henry Aaron et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter BRADFORD]. That consumption taxes 
include both borrowed funds and the proceeds of gifts and inheritances in their base is 
also well known by anyone who has paid for a car with either borrowed or inherited 
funds and discovered that the source of the funds had no effect on the retail sales tax 
due. See id. at 19-21, 60. Because neither the Armey Flat Tax nor the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax treats borrowed funds or the proceeds of gifts and inheritances as income, they lack 
a significant characteristic of consumption taxes. This difference should also allow them 
to pass constitutional muster because it permits the argument that even if they are like 
consumption taxes in what they do not tax, they are like income taxes in what they do 
tax. The constitutional argument in their favor would be that even if the Armey Flat Tax 
and the Nunn-Domenici Tax omit from the base the same kinds of items that would be 
omitted from the base of a consumption tax, they still pass constitutional muster because 
what they do tax fits the definition of income. 
This constitutional argument is premised on the proposition that as long as a tax 
system does not actually tax more than income, the system is constitutionally 
permissible; since neither of the proposed tax systems would necessarily tax more than 
income, the conclusion that both are constitutionally permissible would follow inexorably 
from that premise. The proposition that a system is constitutionally permissible as long 
as it taxes no more than income is consistent with the notion that the Sixteenth 
Amendment sets the outer boundaries of the constitutional power to tax but does not 
command that the full extent of the power be utilized. Cf, Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 
240 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1916) (asserting that "the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment 
conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and 
plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress ... "); Brushaber v. Union 
Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916) (noting that power to tax income was provided 
by Constitution prior to Sixteenth Amendment). 
Nevertheless, because it would include borrowed amounts in the tax base in some 
cases, the Nunn-Domenici Tax presents some potentially thorny constitutional questions. 
See infra note 46. Although the Nunn-Domenici Tax would only include borrowed 
funds in the tax base in situations where that is necessary to prevent abuse, the inclusion 
of such amounts in the base might nevertheless be constitutionally significant. In 
addition, the Nunn-Domenici Tax includes wages in an employer's tax base and in so 
doing might tax something closer to gross receipts than to income, at least in some 
cases. Even if low rates could serve as a proxy for an accurate measure of income in 
some cases, it is far from clear that the rates proposed in the Nunn-Domenici Tax would 
be low enough to accomplish that. In addition, since the business portion of the Nunn-
Domenici Tax would apply to business conducted in both corporate and non-corporate 
form, even if the corporate portion could pass constitutional muster under the rationale 
that allowed the 1909 corporate income tax to survive a consitutional attack in Flint v. 
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (that is, that the tax is an indirect excise tax on 
the privilege of doing business in corporate form and therefore need not be apportioned), 
interesting constitutional questions would remain with respect to the non-corporate 
portion. Further exploration of those questions must await another day. 
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on material capital, consumption taxes do not.29 By taxing only wages 
at the individual level, and only the income from the active conduct of 
a trade or business at the business level, the Armey Flat Tax exempts 
from taxation the return on material capital and thus closely approxi-
mates the economic effect of a consumption tax. 30 
B. The Nunn-Domenici Tax 
Although the Nunn-Domenici Tax is designed to look much like the 
current federal income tax, the Nunn-Domenici Tax would also enact a 
consumption tax.31 Like the current income tax, the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax begins with a broad definition of income. The Nunn-Domenici Tax 
defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived by a 
taxpayer during the taxable year, .... "32 Compared to the canoe the 
29. BRADFORD, UNEASY COMPROMISE, supra note 28, at 60. THE FLAT TAX, 
supra note 12, at 28; Graetz Testimony, supra note 4, at 1257-58. The term "consump-
tion tax" when used in contradistinction to "income tax" may actually be a misnomer 
to the extent that it implies taxation of something not otherwise subject to tax. Income 
taxes can also tax consumption, and they do in the case of every taxpayer who consumes 
income. The federal income tax, for instance, taxes consumption by disallowing 
deductions for personal expenses and losses. Such expenses and losses represent 
consumption and by retaining them in the base, the system subjects them to taxation. 
30. That the Armey proposal fails to create a pure consumption tax does not 
diminish the primacy of the consumption features of the tax. Conceptually, pure 
consumption taxation includes taxation of consumption that takes place with borrowed 
funds or gratuitously transferred amounts (gifts and bequests). Indeed, one of the most 
persuasive arguments for consumption taxation is that because total consumption 
(including consumption financed by borrowing, gifts, and bequests), provides a better 
measure of lifetime ability to pay than annual income, consumption taxes are more 
closely reflective of lifetime ability to pay than income taxes and may be less regressive 
than they appear when analyzed from an annual perspective. See DON FULLERTON & 
DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN (1993); Gilbert E. 
Metcalf, Life Cycle Versus Annual Perspectives on the Incidence of a Value Added Tax, 
in 8 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 45, 49 (James M. Poterba ed., 1994); Don 
Fullerton & Diane L. Rogers, Lifetime Effects a/Fundamental Tax Reform, in ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 32 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 
1996) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM]; see also supra note 28. Neither the 
original Hall/Rabushka design nor the Armey proposal would include borrowings or gifts 
and bequests in the tax base, and both thus differ significantly from a pure consumption 
tax. Indeed, both could therefore be said to be equivalent to a pure consumption tax 
only for individuals who consume an amount equal to their wages and for whom wages 
represent the only source of cash. 
31. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
differences between income and consumption taxes. 
32. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 3(a) (amending I.R.C. § 3). 
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Armey Flat Tax creates, the definition of income in the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax is an ocean liner in both size and complexity. For individuals, the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax narrows the base substantially in three major ways. 
First, the Nunn-Domenici Tax allows the deduction of an amount as a 
"family living allowance."33 Second, the Nunn-Domenici Tax excludes 
from the tax base many of the same amounts excluded under the current 
system.34 Third, the Nunn-Domenici Tax allows deductions compara-
ble to the most popular deductions allowed under the current system,35 
and adds several important new deductions.36 
The most important new deduction added by the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
is the one that has given the tax its popular name and that serves to 
convert what looks like an income tax into something that comes much 
closer to a consumption tax: The unlimited savings allowance. The 
unlimited savings allowance is designed to perniit a deduction for all 
amounts a taxpayer saves. By purporting to tax income but providing 
a deduction for all amounts saved, the Nunn-Domenici Tax succeeds in 
taxing only income that is not saved. Because income not saved is 
presumably consumed, the Nunn-Domenici Tax comes much closer to 
being a consumption tax than the current system.37 
33. Nunn-Domenici Tax § 201(a) (amending I.R.C. §§ l(b), 7). 
34. These include exclusions for gifts and inheritances, tax-exempt bond interest, 
damages received as compensation for personal injury, certain non-cash fringe benefits 
(such as meals and lodging or parking provided primarily for the convenience of the 
employer), and certain amounts attributable to the discharge of indebtedness. Nunn-
Domenici Tax, § 201(a) (amending I.R.C. § 4). 
35. The Nunn-Domenici Tax allows a "homeowner" deduction, a "philanthropic 
transfer" deduction, an alimony deduction and a personal and dependency deduction. 
Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 201 (amending I.R.C. § 1). The allowance of a 
personal and dependency deduction under the Nunn-Domenici Tax is substantially 
equivalent to the treatment of like amounts under the current system. Although the Code 
uses the term exemption with respect to the amounts allowed for the taxpayer, spouse, 
and dependents, section 151 (a) provides thatthe exemption amounts shall be allowed as 
deductions. See l.R.C. § 151(a) (West 1996). 
36. The Nunn-Domenici Tax adds an education deduction and a transition basis 
deduction. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 201 (amending I.R.C. 
§§ l(b)(1)(3)(B), l(b)(l)(4)). · 
3 7. The Nunn-Domenici Tax has been described as consisting of a VAT at the 
business level and a cash-flow consumption tax at the individual level. See Jane G. 
Gravelle, The Distributional Effects of Fundamental Tax Revisions, 33 SAN DIEGO LAW 
REV. 1419 (1997). For insightful commentary on why current tax reform proposals, 
which would enact taxes that are perhaps closer to consumption taxes than to income 
taxes, are nevertheless drafted to look like income taxes, see Graetz Testimony, supra 
note 4, at 1260; Lawrence Zelenak, Flat Tax vs. VAT: Progressivity and Family 
Allowances, 69 TAX NOTES 1129, 1134 (1995). The cognitive phenomenon of "status 
quo bias," which suggests a preference for the familiar, is another reason for disguising 
consumption taxes as income taxes. See Deborah A. Geier, Cognitive Theory and the 
Selling of the Flat Tax, 71 TAX NOTES 241 (1996) (citing Edward J. McCaffery, 
Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1871 (1994)). 
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The Nunn-Domenici Tax is therefore more like the Armey Flat Tax 
than like the current income tax in what it actually attempts to tax. 
Although the Nunn-Domenici Tax begins with a broad definition of 
income, which it reduces to a narrow tax base through the mechanism 
of deductions, as does the current income tax (rather than beginning with 
a narrow base, as does the Armey Flat Tax), that similarity is structural 
only. Like the base of the Armey Flat Tax, the base of the Nunn-
Domenici Tax is radically different from that of the current system. 
Unlike the individual portion of the Nunn-Domenici Tax, the business 
portion of the Nunn-Domenici Tax is both structurally similar to the 
Armey Flat Tax and quite different from the current income tax. The 
business portion of the Nunn-Domenici Tax imposes a flat 11 % tax on 
the "gross profit of [a] business entity for the taxable year."38 Like 
"gross active income" under the Armey Flat Tax, the term "gross profit" 
under the Nunn-Domenici Tax is narrowly defined to include only 
receipts from the sale or use of property or the performance of services 
in the United States, minus certain deductions.39 The Nunn-Domenici 
Tax allows deductions for the costs of business purchases, loss 
carryovers, and the amount of a taxpayer's "transition basis," but it 
allows no deduction for the amount of wages paid to employees.40 
As under the Armey Flat Tax, under the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
businesses are taxed only on their income from business operations. 
Investment income is not included in the business tax base, but the costs 
of servicing investments are not deductible. 
The business portions of the Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax are also similar in that both impose a tax directly on business 
activity regardless of the entity through which the business is conducted. 
Both taxes therefore differ from the current system in two significant 
respects. First, unlike the current system, neither the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax nor the Armey Flat Tax distinguishes between entities with respect 
38. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 301 (amending I.R.C. § 201(b). The 
actual tax liability under the Nunn-Domenici Tax will be the excess of the business tax 
over the payroll tax credit, described infra. Id. (amending I.R.C. § 201(a)). 
39. Id. (amending I.R.C. §§ 202-03). 
40. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 301 (amending I.R.C. § 204); id. 
§ 301(a) (amending I.R.C. §§ 205(a)(3), (4)). For further discussion of the non-
deductibility of wages under the Nunn-Domenici Tax, see infra notes 59-60 and 
accompanying text. 
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to taxation.41 Tax-motivated choice of entity questions would disappear 
under either tax. Second, unlike the current system, both the Nunn-
Domenici Tax and the Armey Flat Tax attempt to integrate the business 
and individual income taxes. They achieve integration in varying 
degrees and through different mechanisms. 
C. Integration of Business and Individual Taxes 
1. The Mechanisms: Yield Exemption and 
Consumed Income Taxes 
The Armey Flat Tax integrates the business and individual income 
taxes by simply not including returns on material capital in the tax base 
of either individuals or businesses.42 Business income is therefore 
taxed once when it is earned as "gross active income" by a business, but 
41. In this respect, given the recent issuance of the check-the-box regulations in 
final form, the Nunn-Domenici Tax and the Armey Flat Tax differ from the current 
system only in the taxation of corporations and publicly-traded partnerships. Treas Reg. 
§ 301.7701-3 (1997), issued on December 17, 1997. Under the check-the-box 
regulations, entities other than corporations, and publicly-traded partnerships (which are 
treated as corporations for tax purposes pursuant to I.R.C. § 7704), may elect to be 
treated either as corporations or as partnerships. Entities may therefore reap the most 
significant benefit of incorporation--limited liability-without necessarily suffering the 
detriments imposed by Section 11 and Subchapter C, just as they would be able to under 
either the Armey Flat Tax or the Nunn-Domenici Tax. For thoughtful commentary on 
the regulations as proposed, and as issued in final form, see W. Kirk Wallace, Check-
the-Box Regulations Released in Proposed Form, 71 TAX NOTES 1401 (1996); Michael 
L. Schier, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 71 TAX NOTES 
1679 (1996); David S. Miller, The Tax Nothing, 74 TAX NOTES 619 (1997); Lawrence 
M. Axelrod, Are Consolidated Returns Obsolete?, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 3-78 (Jan. 6, 
1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File. 
42. I use the term integration here as it has been used under the current system, 
to signify the fusion of the corporate and individual income tax systems into a system 
that taxes a particular type of income only once as it moves from original earner to final 
consumer. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Relation and Integration of Individual 
and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981); George K. Yin, Colloquium 
on Corporate Integration: Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic 
Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431 (1992); George K. Yin, Achieving Corporate Integration 
Through Double Taxation, 56 TAX NOTES 1365 (1992); Jasper Cummings, Taxing 
Business Income Once: Where's the Beef? A Review and Critique of the Treasury 
Integration Study, 54 TAX NOTES 1391 (1992); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case 
Against the Cauble Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N. C. L. REV. 613 (1990); 
Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 965 (1988-89); Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on "integration" of 
Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335 (1975); Alvin 
C.Warren, Jr., ALI Federal Income Tax Project, Reporter's Study of Corporate Tax 
Integration (March 31, 1993); DEPAR1MENT OF THE TREASURY, Report on Integration 
of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (1992). 
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is excluded from the tax base for evermore. The Armey Flat Tax is thus 
a variant of what economists refer to as a "yield exemption tax."43 
In its pure form, a yield exemption tax provides for cash-flow 
treatment of business-level, non-financial investment, but ignores loans 
and interest at both the individual and business levels.44 A yield 
exemption tax is thus somewhat like a back-loaded IRA, where 
contributions are not deductible and are thus taxable at least once, when 
earned, just as business active income is taxed under the Armey Flat 
Tax, but distributions are exempt from tax, just as all investment income 
is exempt under the Armey Flat Tax.45 
By contrast to a yield exemption tax, which taxes income but exempts 
yield, a consumed income tax does not tax income that is saved, but it 
then taxes the full amount, income plus yield, when the amounts are 
withdrawn from savings for use in consumption. If a yield exemption 
tax is like a back-loaded IRA, a consumed income tax is like a front-
loaded IRA, where amounts are deducted from the tax base when saved 
but then are subject to tax when consumed. 
The individual portion of the Nunn-Domenici Tax is a form of 
consumed income tax.46 The Nunn-Domenici Tax allows individuals 
43. See, Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to the 
Direct Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 27, at 72-
73. 
44. Id. at 73. 
45. Of course, a back-loaded IRA is not precisely the same as a yield exemption 
tax because amounts deposited in an IRA could very possibly have already been taxed 
more than once, not just because they might have been subject to payroll taxes, but 
because the amounts may have been taxable to the payor. Amounts received by a payee 
might have been taxable to the payor whenever they were not deductible to the payor. 
That might occur when one individual pays for services rendered by another individual 
who is an independent contractor. Thus, someone providing piano lessons in her home 
would be an independent contractor and have compensation income, but the cost of the 
lessons would not be deductible to most pupils or their parents. 
46. The Nunn-Domenici Tax is not a pure consumed income tax because such a 
tax would include borrowings in the tax base, and the Nunn-Domenici Tax does not 
include borrowings in the tax base directly; section 4(a)(7) of the tax excludes 
"repayable amounts" from income. Nevertheless, the Nunn-Domenici Tax does include 
some borrowings in the tax base to the extent necessary to prevent the unlimited savings 
allowance from becoming a tax shelter by allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts 
borrowed and saved. It accomplishes this by reducing the deduction for amounts saved 
by the total amount of "non-exempt borrowing." Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, 
§ 55. "Non-exempt borrowing" is defined as the amount of debt outstanding during the 
year, other than home mortgage debt on the taxpayer's principal residence, debt incurred 
to acquire consumer durables (up to $25,000), charges for the acquisition of goods and 
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to deduct all amounts saved and then includes in income all amounts 
withdrawn from savings, presumably for use in consumption. It thus 
operates much like a front-loaded IRA, in which amounts contributed to 
the account are deductible, but withdrawals are taxable.47 Because 
economists are confident that yield exemption taxes · and consumed 
income taxes are generally equivalent in present value terms,48 it would 
seem that the individual portions of the Armey Flat Tax (yield exemp-
tion) and the Nunn-Domenici Tax (consumed income) are probably 
equivalent in present value terms.49 
services to the extent paid within the billing cycle in which they are billed, and $10,000 
of other debt. By reducing the amount of the unlimited savings allowance deduction to 
the extent of non-exempt borrowing, the Nunn-Domenici Tax includes in income 
amounts that would have been included but for the borrowing, and thus indirectly taxes 
borrowing. 
47. See I.R.C. § 219 (West 1996). 
48. See, Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to the 
Direct Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 27, at 88. 
See also Appendix B, Equivalence of a Broad-Based Consumption Tax and a Tax on 
Wages and Old Capital, STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, METHODOLO-
GY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 113, 
JCS-7-93, June 14, 1993. 
49. Proposals to introduce a so-called "back loaded" Individual Retirement 
Account in the late 1980's and early 1990's provided many occasions for explanation 
of this general equivalence. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and 
Analysis of S. 612 (Savings and Investment Incentive Act of 1991) (JCS 5-91) (May 14, 
1991). More recently, Gene Steuerle has succinctly explained: 
If tax rates are constant throughout time ... pure ex ante and pure ex post 
taxes leave the taxpayer in exactly the same position when all is said and 
done. In mathematical terms, suppose I have some money (wages) that would 
be taxed at a rate "t." If that is the only tax that is imposed on me, for every 
dollar of wage, I will be left with $(1-t). If this grows at the rate ofreturn "r" 
over some period of time, and r is not taxed, then I am left at the end with 
exactly $(1-t)(l +r). In this tax system, returns from new investment, which 
produce r, are taxed at a zero rate. 
Suppose, instead, that no tax is imposed at the beginning provided I put this 
otherwise taxable money (wages) into an investment. For example, I will not 
be taxed initially on my wage if I am allowed to expense or write off that 
money when I purchase an investment with it. Suppose I start with $1, and 
it produces a rate of return r that is also not taxed over the period that it is 
earned, but not withdrawn. Then at the end of this period I have $(1 +r), and, 
if it is taxed when withdrawn as a pure ex post tax, I have exactly $(1 +r)(l-t). 
As can be seen, the two expressions $(1-t)(l +r)and $(1 +r)(l-t)are equivalent. 
One can reach another type of equivalence above by actually letting r be taxed. 
In addition to the taxation ofr, the government still has a choice as to whether 
to impose an up-front tax or one on ultimate withdrawal. In a one-period 
example, if one pays up front, the total amount of wealth left at the end of one 
period is equal to (1-t)[l +r(l-t)]. If one pays later on the entire withdrawal, 
the total amount left id equal to [l+r(l-t)](l-t). Again, they are equal in value. 
Gene Steuerle, Zero Tax Rates on Returns To New Investment & Learning, 72 TAX 
NOTES 1311 (1996). Nevertheless, Eric Engen and William Gale have argued 
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The business portions of the Anney Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax would impose yield exemption taxes. However, although the Armey 
Flat Tax is a yield exemption tax in its entirety, the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
is actually a hybrid. It is a yield exemption tax in its business applica-
tion but a consumed income tax in its individual application.50 
Thus, both the Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax attempt 
to tax business income only once, although they differ in the way they 
attempt to accomplish that result and achieve it with different degrees of 
success. By attempting to integrate the business and individual taxes, 
both the Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax depart significant-
ly from the current system. Exploration of the ways in which they effect 
that departure is therefore appropriate. 
2. The Proposals: The Armey Flat Tax 
The Armey Flat Tax creates two tax systems, one for employee 
compensation and one for what it classifies as the active income of 
businesses.51 The Armey Flat Tax taxes each of these types of receipts 
persuasively that this general equivalence does not make wage taxes equal to 
consumption taxes because consumption taxes tax consumption from previously existing 
assets, whereas wage taxes do not, and consuption taxes tax excess returns to new 
capital, whereas wage taxes do not. Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of 
Fundamental Tax Reform on Savings, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 30 
at 83, 89-92. 
50. Curiously, Charles McLure and George Zodrow have proposed a hybrid 
consumption tax with precisely the opposite design. See, McLure & Zodrow, supra note 
43, at n.12. 
51. The Armey Flat Tax imposes a tax on "business activities." Armey Flat Tax, 
supra note 9, § l l(a). That tax is imposed on "business taxable income," which is 
defined as "gross active income." Id. Gross active income is, in tum, defined as: 
[G]ross receipts from 
(I) The sale or exchange of property or services in the United States by 
any person in connection with a business activity, and, 
(II) The export of property or services from the United States in 
connection with a business activity. 
Id. The Armey Flat Tax provides no further definition, although it does note that: "For 
purposes of this section, the amount treated as gross receipts from the exchange of 
property or services is the fair market value of the property or services received, plus 
any money received." Id. § 1 l(c)(2)(C). Careful readers will notice that some of the 
terms in the foregoing definition are closely analogous to terms that are relevant under 
the current tax system and that have been difficult to define under it. (Just two examples 
are "active business" under Code section 355 and "trade or business" under Code section 
1371 
only once, and accomplishes this result through two related mechanisms. 
First, the Armey Flat Tax ensures taxation of employee compensation 
at least once. The Armey Flat Tax does this by making cash wages 
deductible at the employer level but including such wages in the income 
of employees.52 The Armey Flat Tax also taxes non-cash compensation 
(fringe benefits) only once. Although non-cash compensation is not 
includable in the income of employees, it is not deductible by employers 
and thus effectively bears a tax at the employer level.53 By contrast to 
the current system, which exempts much non-cash compensation from 
taxation altogether through the mechanism of a deduction at the 
employer level coupled with an exclusion at the employee level, the 
Armey Flat Tax ensures that the cost of fringe benefits is taxed once-at 
the employer level. The Armey Flat Tax thus subjects to tax significant 
amounts of income from labor that the current system leaves untaxed. 
Second, the Armey Flat Tax ensures taxation of ·business active 
income once, by making such income taxable at the business level 
regardless of the legal form in which the business is conducted, but 
leaving returns on investments out of the tax base altogether. That 
narrow definition leaves all other types of income, which include the 
return on investment received by both businesses and individuals, as well 
as windfalls and possibly most damage recoveries, outside of the 
definition of income and therefore exempt from further taxation.54 By 
separating the taxation of business income from the taxation of employee 
compensation, the Armey Flat Tax makes very difficult the type of tax 
shelter activity that spawned the passive activity rules55 and the at-risk 
rules56 that have so complicated the current statute.57 
162.) For example, there is no reason to think terms like "business activity," will be any 
easier to define under the Armey Flat Tax than similar terms are under the current 
system. Indeed, the terms might be even more troublesome given that concluding that 
an amount falls outside the meaning of that term has the effect of exempting that amount 
from tax completely. 
52. Id. §§ 63(a)(l)(A), 102(d)(l)(B). 
53. Id. §§ 102(d)(l)(B), 102(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
54. The definition of income under the Armey Flat Tax differs for financial 
intermediaries, however. The Armey Flat Tax provides that "in the case of the business 
activity of providing financial intermediation services, the taxable income from such 
activity shall be equal to the value of the intermediation services provided in such 
activity." Id. § 1 l(e) (amending I.R.C. § 1 l(e)). With respect to damages, much would 
depend on whether the term "wages" is found to include wage substitutes or replace-
ments. 
55. I.R.C. § 469 (West 1996). 
56. I.R.C. § 465 (West 1996). 
57. By adopting a single rate for both employee compensation and business income 
but imposing a separate tax on business income and eliminating deductions at the 
individual level, the Armey Flat Tax largely eliminates the need for rules that distinguish 
between business and non-business activities. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 183 (West 1996). Since 
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3. The Proposals: The Nunn-Domenici Tax 
The Nunn-Domenici Tax differs from the Armey Flat Tax both in its 
taxation of wage income and in its taxation of business income. Unlike 
the Armey Flat Tax, which taxes cash wages only once-at the 
individual level and at a :flat rate-the Nunn-Domenici Tax will 
sometimes tax cash wages twice--once at the business level and again 
at the individual level-and will do so at different rates.58 Under the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax, cash wages are not deductible at the business level, 
and amounts paid as cash wages are therefore subject to tax at that level, 
at least if the business has any taxable receipts.59 Such amounts may 
be taxable again at the individual level because the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
includes them in the tax base as income and then removes them only if 
they are saved. Cash wages received by individuals who do not save 
them will thus be taxed twice--once at the business level and then again 
when presumptively consumed at the individual level.60 
business expenses (business purchases under the Armey Flat Tax) are only deductible 
from business income, unless an activity generates income, no amounts attributable to 
it will be deductible. Although the Armey Flat Tax does provide for the deduction of 
loss carryovers (see Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § 207) deduction of carryovers is 
only permissible against business income, so that by its structure, the Armey Flat Tax 
achieves the same result as sections 183 and 469 of the Code. Of course, businesses, 
particularly manufacturing businesses that make large capital outlays, will be able to 
shelter large amounts of income under the Armey Flat Tax, and individuals who would 
only be taxed on wages and business income would have an incentive to categorize all 
non-wage income as non-business. 
58. The Nunn-Domenici Tax imposes a flat tax of 11 % on the "gross profit of [a] 
business entity for the taxable year." Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 201(b). As 
currently drafted, the rate schedule for individuals under the Nunn-Domenici Tax phases 
down over the lower brackets for a period of four years, but in the first year it would 
impose a tax that begins at 19% for married individuals filing a joint return who have 
taxable income of less than $5,400, moves to 27% for taxable income between $5,400 
and $24,000, and caps out at 40% for taxable income over $24,000. Id. § 15(a)(l). 
When fully phased in, the tax on married people filing a joint return would be 8% on 
taxable income of less than $5,400, 19% for taxable income between $5,400 and 
$24,000, but still 40% for taxable income over $24,000. Id. 
59. · The Nunn-Domenici Tax specifically provides that compensation expenses of 
employees are not deductible to businesses. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, 
§ 301(a) (amending I.R.C. § 205(a)(3)-(4)). Compensation paid to independent 
contractors is deductible. Id. § 301(a) (amending I.R.C. 205(a)(2)(D)). 
60. These amounts will be taxed at different rates; 11 % at the business level and 
graduated rates that go up to 40% at the individual level. See supra note 58. 
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The taxation of non-cash wages, that is, fringe benefits, is somewhat 
more complicated. Some such amounts will be taxed twice under the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax while others will not be taxed at all. Under the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax some fringe benefits are excludable from the 
income of employees. Indeed, the list of excludable fringe benefits bears 
a striking resemblance to that in sections 132 and 119 of the current 
Code.61 If they are deemed to consitute additional, albeit non-taxable, 
compensation to the employee, those excludable fringe benefits will 
probably not be deductible at the business level.62 In that case, the cost 
of such benefits would be taxed once, at the business level. 
If they are not deemed to consitute additional compensation (perhaps 
because they are not treated as income to the employee), the cost of 
providing such benefits might be deductible to the employer. In that 
case, by allowing a deduction at the business level and permitting an 
exclusion at the individual level, the Nunn-Domenici Tax would fail to 
tax the costs of such fringe benefits at all. In this regard, the Nunn-
Domenici Tax would treat those fringe benefits in the same way that the 
current system treats them. 63 
Nevertheless, not all fringe benefits would receive such generous 
treatment. The value of any fringe benefit that is included in an 
employee's income as compensation will not be deductible to the 
business that provides it; such amounts will therefore be subject to ta:x 
at both the business and individual levels. Like wages, then, the cost of 
fringe benefits included in an employee's income will be taxed twice 
under the Nunn-Domenici Tax unless the employee manages to save an 
offsetting amount.64 Even then, taxation at the individual level will 
61. See Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 4(a)(6)(B). 
62. The text of the proposed statute is unclear on the treatment of excludable 
fringe benefits at the business level. Although the Nunn-Domenici Tax specifically 
provides that compensation expenses are outside the definition of "business purchases" 
that may be deducted from taxable receipts to arrive at the gross profit that is subject to 
taxation (see Subchapter B of the proposal), and further provides that fringe benefits 
included in an employee's income are also not deductible at the business level, it is 
silent on the treatment of the cost of fringe benefits that are excluded from the 
employee's income. Deductibility will probably tum on whether such expenses are seen 
as compensatory. 
63. The Nunn-Domenici Tax defines the category of fringe benefits that receive 
this favorable treatment somewhat differently than does the current Code. For example, 
although Code section 132(t)(5)(C) allows an employee to exclude from income the 
value of parking provided by an employer even if the employee does not require that an 
employee use a vehicle on company business, the Nunn-Domenici Tax so limits the 
exclusion. See Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 4(a)(6)(B). 
· 64. In some cases it will be easy for the employee to obtain a savings deduction, 
as in the case of retirement contributions, but in other cases, such as the cost of 
employer-provided parking or education that will be nearly impossible. See id. 
§ 205(a)(4)(D). The provision of the benefit will always be effectively taxed to the 
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only be deferred, as the amounts will be subject to tax at the individual 
level when withdrawn from savings for use in consumption. 
Non-wage income of individuals may also be taxed more than once 
under the Nunn-Domenici Tax. Although business income will only be 
taxed once at the business level because the business tax base includes 
only the amounts received from the, conduct of business activity (and 
thus excludes returns on investment received at the business level), such 
income may be taxed again at the individual level. This will occur when 
an individual does not save business income received. 
Double taxation of business income will be most conspicuous, and 
most like that which occurs under the current system, when business 
income is received by an individual as a return on investment and is then 
consumed, rather than saved.65 Unlike the Armey Flat Tax, the Nunn-
Domenici Tax only succeeds in integrating the business and individual 
income tax systems when individuals save the business income they 
receive, and the systems remain integrated only so long as the amounts 
remain saved. Business income will be taxed again at the individual 
level when and if consumed.66 Perhaps it is this potential for double 
taxation of business profits that explains the low flat rate of tax on 
employee in that it will always increase the employee's income base while not always 
providing for an offsetting deduction. 
65. Indeed, since the business and individual portions of the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
are only integrated when taxpayers take particular actions, it may be misleading to refer 
to the tax as integrating business and individual taxation, at least in the sense that the 
term integration is used in other contexts, where unification of two systems does not 
depend on specific taxpayer action: For a discussion of integration of the income and 
employment tax systems under the Nunn-Domenici Tax, see Part D, infra. 
66. Despite the general equivalence of yield exemption and consumed income 
treatment, (see McLure & Zodrow, supra note 43, at 88) taxation of business income 
saved but eventually consumed by individuals under the USA tax is not equivalent to the 
exemption provided by the Armey Flat Tax. For example, $x earned by business A and 
distributed to individual Y as a dividend will not be taxed again to Y under the Armey 
Flat Tax regardless of what Y does with it. By contrast, $x paid by business B to 
individual Z under the Nunn-Domenici Tax will be taxed again to Z if Z chooses to 
consume it rather than to save it. Perhaps what this suggests is that the Armey Flat Tax 
is a yield exemption tax only with respect to its treatment of wages at the individual 
level, for with respect to other income, the Armey Flat Tax not only exempts the yield 
but exempts the income as well. The taxes could be equivalent with respect to wages, 
for $x wages paid by business A to individual Y will be taxed to Y under the Armey 
Flat Tax but any amounts yielded by the investment of $x wages will not be taxed again 
to Y. By contrast, $x wages paid by business B to individual Z under the Nunn-
Domenici Tax will not be taxed to Z if saved, and both $x and the amounts yielded by 
it will be taxed to Z when removed from savings for use in consumption. 
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business income (eleven percent) when compared to individual income, 
which is subject to rates than can be as high as forty percent.67 
D. Integration of the Income and Employment Tax Systems 
Although the Nunn-Domenici Tax fails to achieve complete integration 
of the business and individual income tax systems, it does succeed in 
achieving another type of integration: integration of the income and 
employment tax systems. The Nunn-Domenici Tax integrates these tax 
systems by allowing a credit for the amount of social security (FICA) or 
SECA,68 tax paid by both employers and employees.69 Fot individu-
als, the Nunn-Domenici Tax allows a refundable credit for the amount 
of social security taxes paid as well as for half of the amount of SECA 
taxes paid.7° For businesses, the Nunn-Domenici Tax allows a credit 
for the amount of social security taxes paid, and in the case of sole 
proprietors or partners in partnerships, one-half of SECA taxes paid.71 
67. See supra note 58. This potential for double taxation occurs even if the 
business-level Nunn-Domenici Tax is viewed as a VAT, and it is assumed that price 
levels will adjust in response to the tax. See Gravelle, supra note 37. In that case 
individuals will bear the economic burden of the tax when they consume, effectively 
bearing the economic burden of the business and individual levels of the tax at the same 
time. 
68. The SECA, or Self-Employment Contributions Act, tax is the analog to the 
social security tax for self-employed individuals. See I.R.C. §§ 1401-03 (West 1996). 
It is imposed by section 1401 of the Code on the self-employment income of individuals 
at rates that are now the same as the sum of the employee's and employer's share of the 
FICA tax. The effect of the SECA tax is to treat self-employed individuals as both 
employer and employee with respect to the payment of employment tax. Under current 
law, only a portion of the SECA tax is deductible by individuals. I.R.C. § 164(f) (West 
1996). 
69. Section 2l(a) of the proposal provides a credit for the sum of "(!) the 
employee's share of the basic FICA tax, (2) the employee's share of the basic tier 1 
railroad retirement tax, and (3) one-half of the basic SECA tax payable with respect to 
the taxpayer's compensation or earnings during the taxable year." SECA, § 21(a). 
Section 282(a) of the proposal provides a credit for the sum of"(!) the employer's share 
of the FICA tax imposed on wages of its employees during the taxable year, (2) the 
employer's share of the tier 1 railroad retirement tax for its employees during the taxable 
year, and (3) one-half of the allocable portion of the SECA tax (as described in 
subsection (b)(3))." SECA, § 282(a). 
70. See supra note 69. Section 21(c) of the Nunn-Domenici Tax precludes any 
credit for amounts refunded to an individual because they were paid on amounts that 
exceed the wage base. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 21(c). Section 6413(c)(l) 
of the Code now provides for a refund of such amounts and would presumably survive 
the amendment of the Code to be effected by the Nunn-Domenici Tax. I.RC. 
§ 6413(c)(l) (West 1996). Section 20(b) provides that certain credits, including the 
payroll tax credit are, refundable or may, at the taxpayer's election, be treated as a tax 
paid for the following year. 
71. See supra note 69 for an explanation of the credit. 
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Although the business level payroll tax credit is not refundable, it can be 
carried over for up to fifteen years.72 
E. Summary: Comparison of the Salient Features of the 
Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
Despite the general equivalence of yield exemption and consumed 
income taxes,73 examination of the specific provisions of the Armey 
Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax has revealed that the taxes are 
quite different from one another and would produce results that render 
them equivalent neither to each other nor to the current income tax. 
Indeed, each would make significant changes to the current system. The 
Armey Flat Tax would integrate the individual and business taxes 
completely but would not change the relationship between the income 
and payroll tax systems. By contrast, the Nunn-Domenici Tax would 
integrate the business and individual taxes only partially but would 
integrate the income and payroll tax systems completely. In addition, 
while the Armey Flat Tax would subject fringe benefits to tax at the 
business level, the Nunn-Domenici Tax would continue to exclude 
certain fringe benefits from the tax base while subjecting others to two 
levels of taxation. Each of these changes has important consequences 
for the ability of individuals to exercise choice with respect to the 
determination of the tax burden they are ultimately to bear. 
III. AVOIDANCE POWER 
The way in which a tax system is designed determines the extent to 
which individual behavioral choices affect the imposition of the tax.74 
A system of head taxes, for example, gives individuals scant opportunity 
to act in ways that affect the size of their tax bill. By contrast, a tax 
system rife with incentives for specific types of behavior gives 
individuals ample opportunities to act in ways that affect the size of their 
tax bill. The Internal Revenue Code currently imposes taxes that evoke 
both of these prototypes. Whereas the individual income tax allows 
taxpayers to affect the amount of their tax liability by making certain 
72. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 283. 
73. See supra notes 48 and 66 and accompanying text. 
74. The following discussion is taken from Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal 
Autonomy, supra note 6, at 13-17. 
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choices, such as the choice to buy a house rather than to rent, the social 
security tax provides few such choices.75 In addition, the federal 
income tax system correlates the degree of choice it provides to a 
taxpayer's ownership of material capital.76 The social security system 
also reserves for the holders of material capital the few choices it 
provides.77 The grant of opportunities for the exercise of taxpayer 
choice, coupled with the preservation of those opportunities for the 
holders of material capital, reflects and reinforces particular values. 
Those values are personal autonomy and the ownership of material 
capital. 
The grant of taxpayer choice reflects the value of personal autonomy 
because having choices empowers people. It allows them to control 
their destinies. Those who value personal autonomy should therefore 
want to know the extent to which a particular tax system design provides 
for the exercise of personal autonomy as well as the identity of those 
who receive the opportunity to exercise such autonomy. Both the 
Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax would change the 
opportunities for the exercise of personal autonomy provided by the tax 
system. They would therefore change the quantum of power bestowed 
by the tax system. Because the quantum of power it provides is an 
important feature of any tax system, examination of the ways in which 
the Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax would change that 
quantum is important to a study of the tax systems they would establish 
and may even serve as a guide to the likelihood that either will become 
law. 
As Part II described in detail, although both the Armey Flat Tax and 
the Nunn-Domenici Tax narrow the tax base for individuals, each adopts 
a different strategy for doing so. The Armey Flat Tax narrows the base 
by narrowing the definition of income; the base starts out narrow and 
remains that way. By contrast, the Numi-Domenici Tax starts with a 
broad base and then narrows it by providing deductions and credits. 
This difference in strategy creates a significant difference in the quantum 
of avoidance power the two systems provide. 
75. I use the phrase "social security tax" to refer both to the tax imposed on 
employers and employees by Chapter 21 of the Code and to the tax imposed on self-
employed individuals by Chapter 2 of the Code. 
76. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, supra note 6, at 36-37. 
77. Id. at 39-45. 
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A. The Armey Flat Tax 
I. The Individual Portion of the Tax 
The Armey Flat Tax provides little avoidance power for individuals 
who derive most of their income from cash wages and who have little 
choice but to do so. All of the income received by such individuals 
would be included in the tax base under the Armey Flat Tax and would 
be taxed to the extent that it exceeds a threshold amount.78 The only 
ways in which such an individual can avoid the imposition of the tax on 
income above that threshold amount are not to work, not to work for 
cash, or to leave the United States.79 Leaving the United States is not 
78. The only deduction the Armey Flat Tax provides is the standard deduction .. 
Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, §§ 63(b)(2)(A), (C) (amending I.R.C. § 63(a)(l)). The 
standard deduction consists of a basic standard deduction of $21,400 for couples filing 
a joint return and $10,700 for individuals, plus an additional standard deduction of 
$5,000 for each dependent. Id. § 63 (b )(3) (amending I.R.C. § 63(b )). Under the Armey 
Flat Tax, then, the amount of cash wages, retirement distributions, and unemployment 
compensation received would be taxed at a flat rate to the extent that it exceeds the sum 
of the basic standard deduction and additional standard deduction. 
79. Unlike the current system, the Armey Flat Tax would create a territorial system 
of taxation, so no tax would be due on amounts not earned in the United States. See 
Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § lOl(b) (amending I.R.C. § 63(a)(l)(A)). See also, 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know It: Simplification Potential of 
Check-the-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219 (1997); James R. Hines, Jr., Fundamental Tax 
Reform in an International Setting, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 30, at 
465,473. 
Because U.S. taxpayers could avoid the Armey Flat Tax through mere physical 
departure from the United States, (rather than renunciation of citizenship or residency), 
the Armey Flat Tax would provide slightly more avoidance power than that provided by 
the current tax system. The federal income tax not only taxes the worldwide income of 
citizens and residents, but also taxes some of the U.S. source income of former citizens 
and residents who renounce their citizenship, or relinquish their residency. I.R.C. 
§§ 877(a), (e), 7701(b)(10) (West Supp. 1996). Nevertheless, the increase in avoidance 
power provided by the Armey Flat Tax on this ground is slight for two reasons. 
First, the social security tax, which accounts for a substantial portion of the tax burden 
of wage earners, is already largely territorial. The social security tax begins by defining 
employment as service performed within the United States. I.R.C. § 3121 (b )(A)(i) (West 
1989). While some service performed outside the United States is included in the 
definition (such as service aboard an American vessel (I.R.C. § 3121(b)(A)(ii) (West 
1989)), or, under certain conditions, service performed for an affiliate of an American 
employer (I.R.C. § 3121(1) (West 1989)), the additions are few. The reach of the SECA 
tax is somewhat more broad than that of the social security tax, perhaps because the 
SECA tax is part of the income tax system, which is itself a worldwide system. See 
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a realistic option for most individuals who will be subject to the tax, and 
not working is not an option for individuals whose labor is their only 
source of income. 80 Although not working for cash, or not working 
exclusively for cash, might seem like an option for many individuals 
under the Armey Flat Tax, the operation of the burden power granted to 
employers effectively removes the usefulness of that option.81 
The most significant quantum of avoidance power the Armey Flat Tax 
provides for wage earners is the power to avoid the imposition of the tax 
by converting wages into dividends or other distributions of capital. 
However, because wages are deductible at the business level under the 
Armey Flat Tax, while dividends and capital distributions are not, only 
wage-earners who are also business owners will be able to exercise this 
power. Other wage-earners might try to avoid the imposition of the 
Armey Flat Tax by either receiving wages in a different period or having 
someone else receive the wages, both of which are tried, and generally 
failed, techniques under the current income tax. 82 
Because the Armey Flat Tax is not truly flat, issues of timing and 
taxpayer identity will remain important under that tax, as they are under 
the current income tax, at least for taxpayers at the lower end of the 
income scale. Since the Armey Flat Tax provides for a large standard 
I.R.C. § 1402 (a)(ii). 
Second, many of the wage earners, who provide the base for the individual portion of 
the Armey Flat Tax, are unlikely to have a choice whether here or abroad. It is no 
accident that all of those who have reportedly expatriated to save taxes under the current 
system are holders of large amounts of capital, not wage earners. For an analysis of 
proposals to change the tax consequences of the renunciation of citizenship, including 
a description of the scope of the problem and the resulting allocation of power and 
choice, see Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1087 (1996). The 
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 broadened the 
application of section 877 by providing for a presumption of tax avoidance in certain 
cases and expanding the defintion of U.S. source income subject to tax. P. L. 104-91, 
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). See I.R.C. §§ 877 (a), (e), 7701 (b)(l0) (West Supp. 
1997). 
80. Unless a tax is confiscatory, working and paying taxes will always be better 
than not working, at least up to the point where consuming leisure becomes more 
attractive. Under the Armey Flat Tax the choice between working and consuming 
leisure is somewhat more difficult than under a progressively structured tax because the 
marginal cost of work, and therefore the marginal value of leisure, does not increase as 
income increases. 
81. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07 for a discussion of this point. 
82. The ability to accomplish such avoidance will depend on the extent to which 
the doctrines of constructive receipt and assignment of income, which address those 
techniques under the current system, become part of the Armey Flat Tax. See irifra text 
accompanying note 139 for a discussion of likelihood of importation of these doctrines. 
Of course, some possibility for inc.ome-shifting exists even after the application of those 
doctrines, but it is substantially more difficult to accomplish. 
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deduction,83 it has the effect of providing for a zero bracket that is 
coextensive with the amount of that deduction. As long as a tax 
contains brackets, (zero percent and seventeen percent in the Armey Flat 
Tax), taxpayers will have the power to avoid its reach by changing either 
the timing of income or the identity of its recipient so as to cause it to 
fall into the zero bracket. 84 The Armey Flat Tax is therefore not bereft 
of avoidance power for wage earners. Nevertheless, because the Armey 
Flat Tax reserves most of the avoidance power it provides wage-earners 
for those wage-earners who are also business owners, it, like the current 
system, has the effect of reserving the lion's share of what avoidance 
power it does provide for the the owners of material capital. 
2. The Business Portion of the Tax 
The story for individuals who are not primarily wage earners is 
startlingly different, though analytically more complex. The narrowness 
of the definition of income would seem to provide such individuals with 
ample opportunity for the exercise of choice because individuals who 
have income from material capital can choose whether to receive income 
from wages as well as income from material capital and thus can choose 
whether to pay or to avoid the tax on wages. 85 Still, the analysis is 
complicated by the integration of the business and individual tax systems 
and the need to determine the consequences of that integration for the 
exercise of choice. 
83. The deduction is $21,400 in the case of a joint return. See Armey Flat Tax, 
supra note 10, § 101 (amending I.R.C. § 63(b)(2)(A)(i)). 
84. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
85. For individual holders of material capital, the Armey Flat Tax would seem to 
provide an abundance of avoidance power, for such individuals could avoid the 
individual portion of the tax simply by choosing not to work for wages, but to derive all 
of their income from material capital instead. Indeed, for such individuals, the Armey 
Flat Tax would provide greater avoidance power than the current income tax; choosing 
to realize income from material capital rather than from labor would not only reduce the 
rate of tax to which income is subject, as it does under the current system, but it would 
eliminate the individual tax on income from such capital altogether. Thus, business 
owners could choose to forego wages and receive dividends instead. Whether exercising 
such a choice could result in avoidance of the Armey Flat Tax as a whole depends on 
the interaction of the business and individual portions of the tax as I will explain, infra, 
and on the extent to which notions of substance over form would be applied as anti-
avoidance mechanisms under that tax, as they are under the current tax system. 
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Curiously, integration actually reduces choice for the holders of 
material capital. Under the current system, holders of material capital 
have ample opportunity for the exercise of choice. The realization 
requirement means that they can choose whether or not to pay tax on 
gains by choosing whether or not to realize them. 86 This choice exists 
at both the business and individual levels. The Armey Flat Tax removes 
this choice, and thus this opportunity to affect the size of the ultimate 
tax liability, by making realization irrelevant in many contexts. 87 Since 
returns on material capital are not subject to tax at either the business or 
individual levels under the Armey Flat Tax, realization will be irrelevant 
in that context. While the removal of a choice that results in the 
removal of a tax might seem to yield a net positive for taxpayers, that 
result is far from clear, because the removal of the tax is not as complete 
as it might first appear. 
Under the Armey Flat Tax the amount of income taxed when earned 
by a business is potentially greater than the amount of income taxed to 
businesses under the current system. Although capital purchases will be 
expensed under the Armey Flat Tax, 88 many other items that businesses 
now deduct in arriving at taxable income will be subject to tax under the 
Armey Flat Tax. Two major such items are the cost of employee fringe 
benefits and the cost of material capital-interest.89 For many busi-
nesses, particularly the service businesses that comprise an ever 
increasing segment of the American economy, this shift could result in 
the taxation of a larger amount of gross income than is subject to tax 
under current law.90 Moreover, the change from a graduated to a flat 
86. For many under the current system, realization, and the choice that attends it, 
also has the effect of a straightjacket which locks in gain in unrealized form. 
87. Realization will remain relevant in certain business contexts. See, e.g., Cottage 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
88. Of course, immediate deduction of the cost of capital equipment purchases is 
technically a matter of timing only, since under current rules such cost is fully deduc.tible 
over time, without reduction for salvage value. I.R.C. § 168 (West 1996); see Simon 
v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995), ajf'g 103 T.C. 247 (1994); Liddle v. 
Commissioner, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995), ajf'g 103 T.C. 285 (1994). Nevertheless, 
timing matters and tax dollars saved on account of the time value of a deduction 
permitted sooner rather than later are just as valuable as tax dollars saved through an 
outright reduction in the applicable tax rate. 
89. As David Bradford has lucidly explained, the inclusion of interest in the 
business tax base is consistent with its exclusion from the individual tax base. 
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX, supra note 28, 119-29 (1986). 
90. Since 1983, goods-producing jobs have remained almost constant, but service 
jobs have increased by 23 million and currently comprise 79% of the total labor market. 
Employment by Major Industry-Actual and Projected, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
OFFICE OF EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS (Nov. 1995) available on Employment by major 
industry division, actual, and projected (last modified Apr. 9, 1996) <http://stats.bls.gov/ 
emptab05.htm>. 
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rate structure for businesses could also result in higher business taxes for 
those businesses that would be denied the benefit the graduated rates 
currently afford at the lower end of the income scale. 
Under the Armey Flat Tax, then, businesses that use material capital 
to purchase items that are immediately deductible in full, even though 
they generate income for a considerable period of time in the future, will 
have the greatest quantum of avoidance power. The type of choice that 
individual holders of capital now have with respect to the realization of 
gain will be reserved to business managers under the Armey Flat Tax, 
for only they will be able to continue to act in ways that affect the tax 
liability of the business.91 The Armey Flat Tax is therefore low in 
avoidance power generally, and what avoidance power it does provide 
it reserves for holders of material capital who also manage businesses 
that use large amounts of such capital. 
B. The Nunn-Domenici Tax 
1. The Individual Portion of the Tax 
By contrast to the Armey Flat Tax, which provides significant 
avoidance power only for business managers, the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
provides significant avoidance power and grants much of that power to 
individuals in their capacity as such. Not surprisingly, the Nunn-
Domenici Tax is structured like the federal income tax. Although the 
individual portion of the Nunn-Domenici Tax has a much narrower base 
than the federal income tax, the Nunn-Domenici Tax, like the federal 
income tax, provides for a broad definition of income which it then 
91. Despite the integration of the business and individual income taxes the Armey 
Flat Tax would achieve, this feature-----the reservation of avoidance power to business 
managers--ought to make the tax particularly attractive to corporate America. Even if 
Professors Arlen and Weiss are correct that corporate managers actually like the 
corporate tax because it encourages the retention of earnings at the corporate level and 
the making of investments that have short term rewards, (Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. 
Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L. J. 325 (1995)), corporate 
managers should support the Arrney Flat Tax. Like the corporate income tax, the Armey 
Flat Tax reserves for corporate managers the opportunity for the exercise of choice. 
Indeed, an analysis of the corporate income tax through the lens of choice would show 
that if corporate managers like the corporate income tax ( or at least do not dislike it with 
sufficient vehemence to spend significant amounts of time and money trying to change 
it), it is probably because the design of that tax reserves for them significant amounts 
of both avoidance power and burden power. 
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narrows through the prov1s1on of significant deductions. While the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax would lessen the impact of realization on many 
taxpayers, the Nunn-Domenici Tax, unlike the Armey Flat Tax, would 
not render the concept archaic. 
Under the Nunn-Domenici Tax realization will continue to be relevant 
to the determination of income. Individuals will therefore have as much 
ability to choose to realize income, and thus to incur potential tax 
liability, under the Nunn-Domenici Tax as they do under the current 
income tax. In addition, as under the current income tax, under the 
Nunn-Domenici tax, individuals who choose to engage in activities that 
result in deductions will be able to reduce substantially, and perhaps 
even eliminate,92 their federal income tax burden. 
The Nunn-Domenici Tax provides the highest quantum of avoidance 
power for those who can afford to invest, rather than consume, their 
income. In addition to deductions for a family living allowance and 
alimony and child support, which do not generally involve much 
exercise of tax-related choice,93 the Nunn-Domenici Tax provides 
several other deductions that do. Most significant among these is the 
unlimited savings allowance deduction, which clearly allows for the 
exercise of taxpayer choice: All amounts saved as provided by the 
statute are deductible. However, the Nunn-Domenici Tax also provides 
for other deductions, all of which depend on the exercise of taxpayer 
choice and all of which involve activities that can be characterized as 
investments. Those investments are in homes, education, and charitable 
enterprises.94 By providing many opportunities for the exercise of 
92. Although the Nunn-Domenici Tax contains a provision designed to prevent 
individuals from using the unlimited savings allowance deduction as a tax shelter by 
investing, and therefore deducting, borrowed funds (see Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 
10, § 52(a)(2) and supra note 46), individuals could still behave in ways that eliminate 
tax liability because the existence of exclusions from income in the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
base means that taxpayers could receive and consume exempt income while engaging 
in deductible activities with the remainder of their income, thus avoiding all tax liability 
under the Nunn-Domenici Tax. 
93. The decision to structure alimony and child support so that payments are 
deductible to the payor and includable in the income of the payee, as provided by section 
5 of the Nunn-Domenici Tax, does permit the exercise of taxpayer choice. However, 
in most cases, the decision to divorce is probably not tax-motivated. Couples like the 
Drukers are almost certainly rare. Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). The Drukers challenged the constitutionality of the 
marriage penalty and, after their challenge failed in the lower courts, adopted a do-it-
yourself solution to the problem by divorcing but continuing to live together. Id. at 50. 
94. These are the so-called "USA Deductions": The homeowner deduction, the 
education deduction, and the philanthropic transfer deduction. Nunn-Domenici Tax, 
supra note I 0, § 8. While reasonable people can differ on the question whether housing, 
education and philanthropy should be characterized as consumption or investment (for 
two examples of the view that philanthropy is consumption, see Jane B. Baron, Gifts, 
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taxpayer choice, the Nunn-Domenici Tax provides a high quantum of 
avoidance power. 
Having determined that the individual portion of the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax is high in avoidance power, it is necessary to determine who 
receives that power. The answer to that is easy: It is those individuals 
who do not need to consume all of the amounts the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
classifies as income. In the case of individuals who derive the bulk of 
their income from wages, this means that the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
reserves avoidance power for individuals whose wages are high enough 
to allow them both to consume and to save. Like the current income 
tax, then, the Nunn-Domenici Tax gives with one hand while it threatens 
to take away with the other. What it threatens to take away is money, 
at rates that are not only progressive but that reach slightly higher, and 
arrive sooner, than those of the current income tax.95 What the Nunn-
Domenici Tax gives, however, is substantial power to avoid the taking. 
The recipients of that power are the very people who are most threat-
ened: Individuals at the higher end of the taxable income scale. 
Because of the unprecedented opportunity for the exercise of choice that 
the unlimited savings allowance would provide, the avoidance power the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax confers on those individuals is also significantly 
greater than that which the current income tax system confers on owners 
of material capital. 
Moreover, the Nunn-Domenici Tax distributes its avoidance power 
somewhat more broadly than does the current income tax. Under the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax, avoidance power is not reserved for the holders of 
material capital, but is also extended to the owners of human capital 
whose labor commands a sufficiently high price to allow them to save. 
Such individuals also receive a high degree of avoidance power under 
the Nunn-Domenici Tax because they will be able to reduce their tax 
liability by choosing to save rather than to consume. 
Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1989); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of 
Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social 
Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994)), I think it is possible to classify 
such expenditures as investment because the return they provide is likely to be derived 
over the long term, rather than, as is usually the case with consumption, over the short 
term. 
95. For married individuals filing a joint return the current income tax reaches it 
highest bracket, 39.6%, at $250,000 of taxable income. I.R.C. § l(a) (West 1996). The 
Nunn-Domenici Tax reaches its highest bracket, 40%, for such individuals at $24,000 
of taxable income. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 15(a)(l). 
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The integration of the income tax and social security taxes that would 
result from enactment of the Nunn-Domenici Tax adds both to the 
avoidance power it gives individuals generally and to the avoidance 
power it gives holders of human capital in particular.96 Because the 
payroll tax credit would reduce Nunn-Domenici Tax liability, it would 
free up those amounts for investment, thus giving even individuals who 
own only modest amounts of human capital a quantum of avoidance 
power that is nonexistent under the current system. 
2. The Business Portion of the Tax 
Under the Nunn-Domenici Tax, as under the Armey Flat Tax, 
realization will be relevant to the determination of business income, but 
will be largely irrelevant to the taxation of business returns on invest-
ment, as those returns will not be subject to tax. Nevertheless, the 
amount of business income subject to tax is potentially greater under the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax than under either the current income tax or the 
Armey Flat Tax. Although capital purchases and the cost of capital 
(interest) itself would be treated alike under the Nunn-Domenici Tax and 
the Armey Flat Tax, the cost of labor will be treated differently. Not 
only are fringe benefits not deductible under the Nunn-Domenici Tax, 
but wages are not deductible either. The business tax base of the Nunn-
Domenici Tax is therefore potentially much larger than that of either the 
current system or the Armey Flat Tax, and would be particularly so for 
service businesses. The existence of such an enhanced business tax base 
would reserve avoidance power for those businesses which could make 
most use of deductible items-in this case, capital equipment. Thus, 
although the Nunn-Domenici Tax provides much avoidance power for 
businesses with respect to investment income, it provides little avoidance 
power with respect to business income, and what avoidance power it 
does provide for such income it reserves for capital intensive businesses, 
and in particular, for the managers of such businesses. 
Because the Nunn-Domenici Tax does not completely integrate the 
corporate and individual income taxes, it would also reserve significant 
amounts of avoidance power for individuals in their individual capaci-
ties. Business income, taxed once, and in some cases only slightly, at 
the business level, might be subject to tax again at the individual level, 
but that tax could be avoided by the actions of particular individuals.97 
96. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text for a description of that 
integration. 
97. Although business income would be taxed only once, at the business level, (see 
Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 4(a)(12)), the return on such income would be 
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By adding a deduction that is equally available to holders both of hum.an 
and material capital, the Nunn-Dorn.enici Tax provides more avoidance 
power overall and distributes that power more broadly than either the 
current income tax or the Armey Flat Tax. Nevertheless, the Nunn-
Dorn.enici Tax reserves that power for individuals who either own 
material capital or whose income from. hum.an capital (wages) is high 
enough to give them. a meaningful choice between saving and consum-
ing. The grant of such a choice is largely positive. Therefore, when the 
positive aspects of choice are considered, the Nunn-Domenici Tax, like 
the current income tax, appears less progressive overall than a simple 
analysis of its rate schedule might suggest. 
IV. BURDEN POWER 
I have used the term burden power to refer to the ability to shift the 
economic burden of a tax and I have urged that an explicit examination 
of the extent to which tax systems confer burden power, and a determi-
nation of whom they confer such power on, should be an important 
aspect of tax policy analysis.98 Tax systems high in burden power 
impose taxes that are invisible and unknown to those who bear them. 
The economic burden of such taxes proceeds from the decision of 
specific individuals to shift that burden, and can therefore result in the 
dissimilar taxation of individuals similarly situated. While tax systems 
high in burden power might accurately reflect cognitive biases and prove 
politically easy to implement and maintain,99 they deny personal 
autonomy to those who must ultimately bear their economic burden. 
The invisibility of such systems renders those subject to them powerless 
to react politically. In addition, the ability of individuals to act to shift 
the economic burden of taxes thus imposed results in the privatization 
of the decision to tax, which further erodes the ability of those subject 
to such taxes to react to them. Individuals who ultimately bear the 
economic burden of taxes high in burden power are denied the ability to 
take action in response to them because they know neither that they bear 
taxed again at the individual level if not invested. Such return would constitute income 
to the individual receiving it and would be subject to tax unless eliminated from taxable 
income by an offsetting deduction. See id. §§ l(b), 3(a). 
98. See Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, supra note 6, at 23-39. 
99. See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
1861, 1864 (1994). 
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them nor who might have imposed them. Such tax systems should be 
eschewed by anyone who values personal autonomy. 100 
A. The Armey Flat Tax 
The nominal burden of the individual portion of the Armey Flat Tax 
is imposed on those who will almost certainly bear its economic 
burden. 101 By contrast, the nominal burden of the business portion of 
the Armey Flat Tax is not imposed on those who will bear its economic 
burden. Since business activity as such is not a corporeal being, it 
cannot bear the economic burden of the Armey Flat Tax. The question, 
of course, is what a corporeal being does. 
By integrating the business and individual tax systems, the Armey Flat 
Tax ensures that income is taxed only once. Thus, under the Armey Flat 
Tax cash wages will be subject to tax at the individual level and not at 
the business level, 102 and employees will probably bear the economic 
burden of the tax imposed on them, just as they bear the economic 
100. This argument is distinct from the argument about the desirable distribution of 
the economic burden. Both the Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax have been 
assessed as imposing economic burdens that are distributed regressively because they 
enact tax increases for lower income families and tax reductions for higher income 
families, Michael J. McIntyre & C. Eugene Steuerle, Federal Tax Reform, A Family 
Perspective, Doc. 96-19672, discussed in Heidi Glenn, Flat Tax Would Sting Low-
Income Families, Study Finds, 72 TAX NOTES 275 (1996). It is possible that at least part 
of the reason for this result is the increased quantum of burden power these taxes 
provide. Gale, Houser and Scholz conclude that the Armey Flat Tax would "increase 
average effective rates by at most 2.2 percentage points for families in the bottom 40% 
of the income distribution, and by 1.3 percentage points or less for income groups above 
the fourtieth and below the top one percent of the income distribution," and that families 
in the top 1 percent would receive tax cuts averaging $37,900; a 7 percent reduction in 
average effective rates. William G. Gale, Scott Houser & John K. Scholz, Distributional 
Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 30, at 
289-90. They also conclude that the Nunn-Domenici tax would "keep tax liabilities 
nearly constant in the bottom decile of the income distribution and lower taxes by 1. 1 
to 3.2 percentage points for families in the tenth to seventieth percentile of the income 
distribution. These tax reductions are financed by 3.4 to 5.9 percentage point tax 
increases in the top 5 percent of the income distribution." Id. at 301. 
101. Although the incidence of the two tax reform proposals is difficult to 
determine, economists generally assume that taxes nominally imposed directly on 
individuals in their individual capacity are economically borne by them. Id. at 284; 
ALBERT ANDO ET AL., THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 32 
(1985); Jane G. Gravelle, The Distributional Effects of Fundamental Tax Revisions, 
supra note 37; Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat Tax and Other Proposals: Who Will Bear the 
Tax Burden?, 69 TAX NOTES 1517 (1995). 
102. I use the term wages here generically, to include amounts that substitute for 
wages and are therefore subject to tax at the individual level under the Armey Flat Tax. 
See supra note 52. 
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burden of the current income tax on wages. 103 In addition, under the 
Armey Flat Tax employees are likely to bear the economic burden of the 
tax on non-cash compensation. 
Even though non-cash compensation would not be taxed at the 
employee level, such compensation would be taxed at the employer 
level. 104 Employers are likely to shift the economic burden of the tax 
on such non-cash compensation to employees, just as they shift the 
economic burden of the employer's portion of the social security tax 
under the current system. 105 This, in turn, will make it practically 
impossible for employees to avoid the Armey Flat Tax by choosing to 
work for non-cash compensation rather than for cash compensation. 
Employees who succeed in persuading employers to replace cash 
compensation with non-cash compensation under the Armey Flat Tax are 
not likely to receive as much compensation as they would have received 
if they had been willing to take cash. 106 They will thus bear the 
economic burden of the tax whether they take a greater amount in cash 
compensation and pay the tax, or a lesser amount in non-cash compensa-
tion, free of tax. As analysis of the social security tax has revealed, the 
effect of adopting a tax system that provides for a narrow base by 
limiting inclusions, rather than providing deductions, is to leave those 
103. Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis so assumed when it attempted to distribute 
the burden of the Armey Flat Tax. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF 
TAX ANALYSIS, New Armey-Shelby Flat Tax Would Still Lose Money, Treasury Finds, 
70 TAX NOTES 451 (1996). Jane Gravelle does likewise in her analysis in this issue, 
although she takes issue with, and refines, Treasury's position. GRAVELLE, The 
Distributional Effects of Fundamental Tax Revisions, supra note 37. See also Gale, et 
al., supra note 100, at 284. 
104. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for a discussion of taxation of non-
cash wages under the Armey Flat Tax. 
105. See supra text following note 53. 
106. For example, an employer who is willing to pay $ 100 in cash compensation 
might not be willing to pay $100 in non-cash compensation. The $100 of cash 
compensation is deductible and thus costs her only $83 (a $100 deduction for an 
employer who pays taxes at the rate of 17%, as all employers will under the Armey Flat 
Tax, brings the cost of the expenditure to $83 (100 minus 17)). However, the $100 in 
non-cash compensation is not deductible and therefore costs her the full $100. Although 
such an employer should be willing to pay the employee $83 in non~cash compensation, 
for the employee the receipt of $83 in non-cash compensation is precisely equivalent to 
the receipt of $100 in cash compensation. In both cases the employee is left with $83 
after taxes, assuming the cash compensation otherwise received exceeds the standard 
deduction provided under the Armey Flat Tax. (The tax rate for individuals is also 17%.) 
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who cannot control the type of inclusions they receive with scant 
avoidance or burden powers. 107 
In addition to providing employers with burden power with respect to 
the tax on non-cash wages, the Armey Flat Tax gives businesses in 
general, even those businesses that have no employees, significant 
amounts of burden power with respect to the tax on the proceeds of 
business activity. Under the Armey Flat Tax, income other than cash 
wages will be taxed at the business level only. The Armey Flat Tax 
thus has a narrower base at the individual level than does the current 
income tax. However, by eliminating the taxation of the business 
income of pass-through entities at the individual level and replacing it 
with taxation of that income at the business level, the Armey Flat Tax 
also creates a broader base at the business level for such entities. This 
shift from primary taxation of some business income at the individual 
level to primary taxation of that income at the business level will also 
shift the allocation of burden power. 
It is, of course, axiomatic that only people can bear the economic 
burden of taxes. While the economic burden of taxes imposed on 
individual income is generally borne by the individuals on whom the tax 
is nominally imposed, the economic burden of taxes nominally imposed 
on businesses can be borne by different categories of individuals. Thus, 
the economic burden of business taxes can be borne by holders of 
material capital, in the form of lower returns, by providers of labor, in 
the form of lower wages, by consumers, in the form of higher prices, or 
by some combination of the foregoing. 
Under the current income tax this analysis has been restricted to the 
corporate income tax. 108 Because it is a separate tax imposed on 
distinct entities, the corporate income tax is easy to isolate, and its 
economic burden therefore cries out for separate distribution. 109 By 
107. Although the additional standard deduction provided by the Armey Flat Tax 
(see supra note 78), is analogous to the dependency exemptions of current law and might 
conceivably be considered to provide some avoidance power through the acquisition of 
dependents, any such claim would be spurious. It is difficult to imagine that the 
economic cost of acquiring a dependent would not exceed the tax benefit of an 
additional deduction. 
108. See, Thomas A. Barthold et al., A Comparison of Distribution Methodologies, 
in DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TAX POLICY 96, 108-09 (David F. Bradford ed., 1995); 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., METHODOLOGY AND 
ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 48 (Joint 
Comm. Print 1993). 
109. The· Joint Committee on Taxation, the Office of Tax Analysis of the 
Department of the Treasury and the Congressional Budget Office, each of which 
produces "burden tables" that show the expected distribution of the economic burden of 
a tax among the population, all produce such tables for the corporate income tax, 
although each uses somewhat different assumptions in compiling its tables. See 
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contrast, the income tax that results from the business activities of 
proprietorships and pass-through entities is hard to distinguish from 
either the corporate or individual income taxes and generally blends with 
those taxes in burden tables. 110 In addition, recent data shows that C 
corporations generate more income than S corporations, partnerships, and 
non-farm proprietorships combined, making the separate distribution of 
the tax imposed on them more of a social and economic imperative than 
the distribution of a tax that is smaller and that is blended with the 
individual income tax. 111 This combination of factors explains why the 
federal income tax imposed on the business activities of proprietorships 
and pass-through entities has not been separately distributed, but the 
corporate income tax has. 112 Nevertheless, if the economic burden of 
the entity-level corporate tax is shifted, it is reasonable to suppose ~hat 
the economic burden of a separate, entity level, Armey Flat Tax on non-
corporate business entities will be shifted as well. 
That all businesses, whether or not in corporate form, could shift the 
economic burden of the business portion of the Armey Flat Tax, leads 
to the conclusion that the business portion of the Armey Flat Tax would 
be high in burden power and that it would bestow such power on the 
owners of businesses. Since the same could be said of the currently 
effective federal income tax, the existence of burden power at the 
Barthold, supra note 108, at 107-09. 
110. Income of pass-through entities that have corporate owners would be taxed to 
those corporate owners and would thus blend with the corporate income tax, and income 
of pass-through entities that have individual owners would be taxed to those individual 
owners and thus blend with the individual income tax. While the coporate and 
individual income taxes are distributed, the amount of such taxes attributable to the 
income of pass-through entities is not. See Barthold, supra note 108, at 108-09; see JCT 
Pamphlet, supra note 9, at 72-73. 
111. See, Tom Petska, Taxes and Organizational Choice: An Analysis of Trends, 
1985-1992, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 86, 91, 
Figure H (Spring, 1996) [hereinafter SOI Bulletin]. Thus, statistics between 1985 and 
1992 show that C corporations had more than seven times the business receipts of S 
corporations. Id. For example, whereas C corporations had business receipts of 
approximately $8 trillion, S corporation had receipts of just over $1 trillion in 1992. In 
addition, corporations generally had over eight times the business receipts of partnerships 
and non-farm proprietorships combined. Id. Figure G. In addition, C corporations 
generate three times more profits than S corporations, Id. at 91 (Figure J), and 
corporations generally generate three times the profit of partnerships and non-farm 
proprietorships. Id. at 91 (Figure I). 
112. I include proprietorships as entities for this purpose since the Armey Flat Tax 
is levied on them separately from the individual tax. 
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business level does not suffice to distinguish the Armey Flat Tax from 
the federal income tax. Something else does, however. 
That something else is the degree of visibility of the business portion 
of the Armey Flat Tax. The visibility of a tax affects the quantum of 
burden power it provides because power has to be perceived to be 
utilized. 113 A tax that arguably provides the same amount of burden 
power as the current income tax but that is more visible than the current 
tax will actually provide a greater quantum of burden power than does 
the current income tax because the increased visibility of the tax will 
make it more likely that the burden power it provides will actually be 
exercised. 
The business portion of the Armey Flat Tax imposes a tax that is more 
visible than the current income tax imposed on business income earned 
by proprietorships and pass-through entities. The tax imposed by the 
business portion of the Armey Flat Tax is more visible than the current 
income tax because the business portion of the Armey Flat Tax is 
imposed at the entity level. Imposition at the entity level means that the 
amount of tax due will be determined by the business activity of the 
enterprise alone rather than by the vicissitudes of the owner's tax 
situation, as is the case under the current federal income tax insofar as 
it applies to proprietorships and pass-through entities. In addition, 
imposition at the entity level means that the tax will have to be paid by 
the entity, out of entity profits, and will directly reduce the amounts 
available for distribution to the owners of the business and perhaps even 
affect an owner's view of a manager's performance. 
The business portion of the Armey Flat Tax will therefore be visible 
in the way that the present corporate tax is visible, but that the tax 
imposed on the business activities of pass-through entities, which 
becomes part of the individual owner's tax liability and varies with the 
level of that liability, is not. Under the current system, the business tax 
liability of owners and managers of proprietorships and pass-through 
entities is part of the total tax liability of such individuals. Although the 
income from such activities is reported on separate schedules that are 
sometimes made a part of the individual's return, the actual tax paid on 
the income generated by such activities is not separately stated or 
computed. 114 The amount of tax ultimately due on that business 
113. See Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, supra note 6, at 27-32. 
114. Income and deductions from the business activities of proprietorships are 
reported on Schedule C; income and deductions from the business activities of pass-
through entities, such as partnerships and S corporations, are reported on Schedules K-1. 
Although the Schedules K-1 are not attached to the individual's return, items of income, 
and some deductions from them, appear on the individual's return. Schedule C is made 
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income is affected by the owner's filing status, the amount of her 
income from other sources, and the amount of her personal deductions, 
such as alimony, home mortgage interest, and charitable contribution 
deductions, as well as by the availability of dependency exemptions. It 
is therefore difficult to isolate the amount of tax attributable exclusively 
to the business. 
Under the Armey Flat Tax, however, the amount of tax liability 
attributable to business activity will not only be separately stated but will 
be unaffected by the personal circumstances of the individual owners of 
the business. Owners and managers of proprietorships and pass-through 
entities will probably develop a level of business-related tax sensitivity 
that currently exists primarily for owners and managers of C corpora-
tions.115 The increased visibility that will result from entity-level 
taxation is therefore likely to result in an increase in the quantum of 
burden power at the entity level. 
In sum, the Armey Flat Tax will not greatly affect the burden power 
of individual wage earners since they currently have little, and the 
Armey Flat Tax does not give them much more. However, the business 
portion of the Armey Flat Tax will result in increased utilization of 
burden power by the owners and managers of proprietorships and pass-
through entities. Such increased utilization will have the effect of 
shifting an increased amount of the economic burden of the taxes 
imposed on the business activity of proprietorships and pass-through 
entities from the owners of such entities to other individuals. Those 
a part of the individual's Form ·1040. 
115. I ascribe the difference in the exercise of burden power not to the notion that 
the current corporate income tax is thought to be a second tax that must be avoided at 
all costs, but to the notion that it is a highly visible tax for those who are directly 
affected by the profitability of the enterprise. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 91 
(arguing that the self-interest of corporate managers explains the longevity of the 
corporate income tax). Once other taxes on businesses activity achieve the same degree 
of visibility as the corporate income tax, I believe that they will be subject to the same 
level of scrutiny as the corporate income tax-a level of scrutiny that they manage to 
escape under the current income tax system. With increased scrutiny will come 
increased incentive to shift the economic burden of the tax. Although I know of no 
empirical work that would support this conclusion, I believe that Professor McCaffery's 
work on cognitive theory and tax system design, and Professors Arlen and Weiss' work 
on the attractiveness of the corporate income tax for corporate managers, suggests that 
an important attribute of a tax is its visibility by those who manage a business and feel 
directly responsible for its bottom line. See McCaffery, supra note 99; Arlen & Weiss, 
supra note 91. 
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other individuals, whether they be consumers or providers of labor, will 
therefore end up bearing an increased portion of the economic burden of 
the tax, although neither they nor economists will know exactly how 
much more. By imposing a separately stated, and therefore highly 
visible, tax at the entity level, the Armey Flat Tax will make it easier for 
holders of material capital to shift the economic burden of taxes to 
consumers and providers of labor. 
B. The Nunn-Domenici Tax 
Like the Armey Flat Tax, the Nunn-Domenici Tax imposes two 
separate taxes, one at the individual level and another at the business 
level. Like the Armey Flat Tax, the Nunn-Domenici Tax treats 
proprietorships as entities, 116 but the business portion of the Nunn-
Domenici Tax would be imposed at a much lower rate ( eleven percent) 
than the individual portion, which would be imposed at graduated rates 
of up to forty percent.117 In addition, the Nunn-Domenici Tax does 
not provide a deduction for wages at the business level, although it 
includes wages in the tax base of the individuals who receive them. The 
Nunn-Domenici Tax thus taxes wages twice, once at the business level 
by not providing a deduction, and again at the individual level by 
including them in the tax base of recipients. The double taxation of 
wages under the Nunn-Domenici Tax appears to be ameliorated 
somewhat by the provision of a · credit, at both the individual and 
business levels, for payroll taxes paid on those wages. Nevertheless, the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax will yield an allocation of burden power that differs 
significantly from that provided by the current income tax. 
The current income tax reserves most of the burden power it provides 
for the holders or managers of material capital. It does this in two ways. 
First, it imposes the entity level corporate tax, which is shifted to 
individuals in ways that economists do not yet fully understand. 118 
Second, it imposes the payroll tax, which is shifted to the providers of 
labor in ways that economists do claim to understand. 119 By imposing 
an entity-level business tax, the Nunn-Domenici Tax increases the 
visibility of the business tax and is likely to increase the exercise of 
burden power by owners or managers of proprietorships and pass-
through entities. 120 Like the Armey Flat Tax, then, the Nunn-
116. Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 206(a). 
117. See supra note 58 for a discussion of rate structure and phase-ins. 
118. See Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, supra note 6, at 30-32. 
119. See id. at 44-45 & n.96. 
120. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
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Domenici Tax will probably increase the degree to which burden power 
is exercised and will thus exacerbate the effects of the grant of burden 
power to the owners and managers of material capital. 121 
The Nunn-Domenici Tax differs significantly from the Armey Flat Tax 
in that it integrates the income and payroll tax systems. Integration at 
the individual level has no significant implications for the existence of 
burden power because individuals do not have burden power with 
respect to payroll taxes under the current system and integration does not 
add any. Because the payroll tax credit provided to individuals by the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax is a refundable credit, 122 its effect would be to 
remove the economic burden of the employee's portion of the payroll 
tax. 123 Employees who had income tax liability would be relieved of 
that liability to the extent of payroll taxes withheld, and employees who 
had no income tax liability would receive a check refunding the amounts 
of payroll taxes paid. 
Integration of the income and payroll taxes at the business level 
should eliminate burden power for employers because it will largely 
eliminate the economic burden of the tax for them. If there is no burden 
to bear, there should be no burden to shift.124 The Nunn-Domenici 
Tax should therefore eliminate the economic burden of the payroll tax 
in all cases in which the employer can fully utilize the credit to reduce 
its income tax liability. When employers cannot fully utilize the credit 
in a current year and must instead carry it over to subsequent years, 125 
they will bear the economic burden of the payroll tax for that current 
year. Nevertheless, such employers are not likely to have much burden 
power with respect to that tax, not because they might be relieved of its 
121. It is difficult to speculate on the extent to which the reduced rate of the 
business level tax under the Nunn-Domenici Tax (11 % vs. 17% under the Anney Flat 
Tax) will offset the absence of full integration of that tax with the individual level tax 
and thus affect the exercise of burden power. My suspicion is that neither the difference 
in the rate nor the failure of integration will significantly affect the exercise of burden 
power because it is always better to pay no tax rather than some tax; clearly, it is also 
preferable to pay a smaller tax rather than a larger tax. 
122. See Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 20(b). 
123. For an analysis of the role of taxpayer choice in allocating the economic 
burden of the payroll tax, see Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, supra note 
6, at 39-50. 
124. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of the 
payroll tax credit); see also supra note 123 (explaining the payroll tax). 
125. See Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 28l(a). 
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economic burden in the future as a result of the carryover,126 but 
because they are unlikely to be able to act to shift its economic burden 
in the short run.127 This inability, coupled with the difficulty of 
determining whether a particular employer will end up in an excess 
credit position in any given year, suggests that the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
payroll tax credit will eliminate the need for employers to consider 
shifting the economic burden of the payroll tax. 
The Nunn-Domenici Tax thus appears to eliminate a significant source 
of burden power in the current system: the power of employers to shift 
the economic burden of payroll taxes to generally unknowing and 
unsuspecting employees. An important question is whether the Nunn-
Domenici Tax replaces the lost burden power with any other power. It 
does. The Nunn-Domenici Tax replaces the power to shift the economic 
burden of the payroll tax with the power to shift the economic burden 
that results from the non-deductibility of wages at the employer level. 
The effect of the payroll tax credit mechanism for employers, which 
removes the economic burden of the payroll tax and therefore the need 
to shift it, cannot be analyzed in isolation but must be considered in 
conjunction with the denial of a deduction for wages. By denying 
employers a deduction for wages but providing them with a credit for 
payroll taxes paid, the Nunn-Domenici Tax takes burden power away 
from employers with one provision but gives it with another. It takes 
burden power away by removing the economic burden of the payroll tax, 
as explained above. It gives burden power because it makes employers 
bear the nominal burden of the tax imposed at the employer level on 
wages paid; employers, who pass on the economic burden of payroll 
taxes to employees under the current system, are almost certain to pass 
on the economic burden of the increased income tax occasioned by the 
nondeductibility of wages under the Nunn-Domenici Tax. 128 It is 
therefore likely that employees will end up bearing the economic burden 
of the double taxation of wages perpetrated by the Nunn-Domenici Tax, 
126. Of course, the carryover can never make a taxpayer whole because it fails to 
account for the time value of money. · 
127. See JCT Pamphlet, supra note 9, at 43. 
128. Examples of non-deductible wages exist under the current income tax (e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 162(m) (compensation in excess of $1 million), 280G(a) (excess parachute 
payments) (West 1996)), but no evidence of the extent to which employees bear the 
resulting burden of the employer-level tax appears to be generally available. While 
employees almost certainly bear the burden of wages not paid because they would be 
non-deductible, it is less clear that they bear the burden of non-deductibility by, for 
example, receiving a smaller amount of non-deductible wages than would otherwise be 
the case. It is difficult, however, to imagine that they would be able to escape that 
burden in the long run. 
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and will do so as unknowingly as they currently bear the economic 
burden of the employer's portion of the payroll tax. 129 
The grant of burden power to employers with respect to the taxation 
of wages under the Nunn-Domenici Tax is even more insidious than the 
grant of burden power to employers with respect to payroll taxes under 
the current system because the grant of power under the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax is achieved under a system that appears to provide employees with 
more favorable treatment than the current tax system: It provides the 
individual level payroll tax credit to eliminate the economic burden of 
the employee portion of the payroll tax, and it appears to eliminate the 
burden power that attends the employer portion of the payroll tax by 
eliminating its economic burden through the mechanism of the employ-
er-level payroll tax credit. Nevertheless, employees do not receive 
additional burden power under the Nunn-Domenici Tax, and employers 
retain the same burden power they have under the current system, 
although it will sometimes apply to a smaller amount of tax. 130 
Employers and individual owners of material capital will enjoy burden 
power, providers of labor will not, and providers of labor will continue 
129. The additional burden that the Nunn-Domenici Tax imposes on employers is 
substantial. By denying employers a deduction for wages, the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
imposes a tax of 11 % on those amounts. For wages up to $62,700, the social security 
wage base, the tax would be 11 % of $62,700,.or $6,897. The economic impact of that 
additional tax would be ameliorated by the grant of a credit for the amount of payroll 
taxes paid. At the current rate of 7.5%, the payroll tax, and the resulting credit, would 
amount to $4,702.50. Thus, whereas non-deductibility of wages up to the social security 
wage base will cost employers $6,897 in tax, the provision of the payroll tax credit will 
only save them $4,702.50 in tax. The difference, $2,194.50, is the tax attributable to 
each employee who earns an amount precisely equal to the social security wage base. 
For employees who earn more than that, the cost of the Nunn-Domenici Tax is simply 
11 % of the additional amount of wages. For employees who earn less, the cost will be 
less, but it will always amount to 3.5% of wages paid (the difference between the 11 % 
cost and the 7.5% credit). In both the over- and under-base cases, the actual cost is 
likely to exceed my rough calculations. This is because the non-deductibility of some 
currently deductible fringe benefits will also add to the cost of labor and those costs will 
likely be shifted, if they continue to be incurred. Another possibility is that they will 
be transfered to employees outright if employers simply stop providing the benefit. 
130. An employer's burden power under the Nunn-Domenici Tax will amount to 
3.5% of compensation up to the social security wage base, whereas an employer's 
burden power under the current system amounts to 7.5% of the social security wage 
base. Employers who pay compensation in excess of the social security base ($62,700), 
which would not be subject to section 162(m), will experience an increase in burden 
power under the Nunn-Domenici Tax-from 7.5% of compensation up ·to the social 
security wage base to 7.5% of compensation up to the social security wage base plus 
11 % of compensation above it. See supra note 129. 
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to bear the economic burden of taxes that they do not know they are 
bearing. Plus i;a change, plus c 'est la meme chose. 
V. SIMPLE OUTLINES, HIDDEN VALUES, AND COMPLEX CHOICES 
A. The Armey Flat Tax-Simple Outline, Complex Effects 
The foregoing examination has revealed that the Armey Flat Tax 
provides scant avoidance power for wage earners, but provides 
substantial avoidance power for individuals, who, through their 
ownership of material capital, own businesses. 131 In addition, although 
131. Following is a tabular presentation of the foregoing analysis. It divides the 
universe of affected taxpayers into individuals (with and without material capital) and 
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the Armey Flat Tax bestows almost no burden power on wage earners, 
the tax system that would result from enactment of the Armey Flat Tax 
would be rich in burden power. By retaining the current payroll tax 
system, which is lavish in its provision of burden power to employers, 
and imposing a business tax that owners and managers of material 
capital alone will be able to shift, enactment of the Armey Flat Tax 
would produce a tax system richer in burden power than is the current 
system. As with the current tax system, that richness of power· would 
be reserved for the holders and managers of material capital. 
The failure of the Armey Flat Tax to provide much avoidance power 
to wage earners is likely to be a significant impediment to its enactment. 
By eliminating much of the avoidance power that individuals have under 
the current income tax system, the Armey Flat Tax will remove 
individuals' ability to act in ways that allow them to affect, and therefore 
control, their tax destinies. It will deny individuals the ability to 
exercise personal autonomy in connection with the determination of their 
tax liability. While individuals might be willing to give up personal 
autonomy under certain circumstances, thoughtful analysis of the Armey 
Flat Tax reveals that it fails to provide such circumstances. Even if 
individuals were willing to surrender personal autonomy in exchange for 
a simpler tax system, before endorsing such a system, they would need 
to ask whether the system really made up in simplicity what it cost in 
personal autonomy. 
The Armey Flat Tax purports to achieve greater simplicity by 
eliminating deductions. To the extent that individuals will not need to 
learn what items are deductible, keep the necessary records, and fill out 
the necessary forms, the filing of tax returns under the Armey Flat Tax 
will unquestionably be simpler than under the current income tax system. 
Nevertheless, such surface simplicity belies not only the deeper 
complexities that lurk in the determination of the tax base, but also the 
values implicated by the elimination of surface choice and the retention 
of interior complexity. In other words, while the Armey Flat Tax might 
be simple enough to cause significant loss of personal autonomy when 
compared to the current tax system, in many respects the Armey Flat 
Tax is not dramatically simpler than the current income tax system. 
There are three reasons for this. 
First, for over seventy percent of individual taxpayers, filling out tax 
forms under the Armey Flat Tax will not be significantly simpler than 
The pattern that emerges is stark: material capital is the favored child of each of these 
tax systems, but the favors are greater under either of the reform proposals than under 
the current system. 
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filling out tax forms under the current system. Preliminary data for 1994 
returns shows that over seventy percent of taxpayers claimed the 
standard deduction, and that the standard deduction accounted for nearly 
half of all deductions claimed. 132 For most taxpayers, filling out tax 
forms is so simple now that the IRS has established a TeleFile program, 
which allows taxpayers to file their tax returns using the telephone, and 
hopes to increase its availability during future filing seasons. 133 
Indeed, whatever complexity exists for those taxpayers stems not from 
the income tax system proper but from the operation of the earned 
income tax credit, a program designed not to raise revenue but to 
ameliorate the effect of the payroll tax by providing positive cash 
assistance to low income working parents. 134 
Second, for many taxpayers, complexity will not disappear. For 
business owners, the need to define deductible inputs and to distinguish 
active business income (taxable) from returns on investment (not taxable) 
is likely to keep alive the issues that spawned Corn Products, 135 and 
later, Arkansas Best. 136 Individuals with hobbies that generate any 
income at all will also be subject to the business tax reprieve and will 
therefore need to know which costs qualify as inputs deductible from 
income and which do not. While the problem of distinguishing business 
from personal expenses will disappear for individuals with no non-wage 
132. Therese M. Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 1994, 
SOI BULLETIN, supra note 111 at 6. Martin A. Sullivan, The Average Tax Return: 
$25,000 and No Deductions, 71 TAX NOTES 1409 (1996). 
133. In December 1996, the IRS announced plans to invite over 22 million 
taxpayers to participate in TeleFile. IR 96-48, 96 TNT 236-17 (December 5, 1996). By 
April 12, 1996, the IRS had received an estimated 2.7 million returns through its 
TeleFile program, up from approximately 650,000 in 1995. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Filing 
Season Was 'Smooth,' But Electronic Returns Are a Bit Stale, 71 TAX NOTES 580 
(1996). The IRS "expect[ed] to receive 3 million TeleFile returns" by the end of the 
1996 tax season. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Filing Season Stats Show Electronic Filing 
Rebound, 70 TAX NOTES 1216 (1996). See also Lawrence Summers, Summer's 
Thoughts on Tax Cuts, Tax Administration, and Tax Reform, 72 TAX NOTES 927, 929 
(1996) (stating that "[a]n additional 2.8 million people using the E-Z form" used TeleFile 
program); George Guttman, TeleFile-Great Idea, but Still a Money Loser, 70 TAX 
NOTES 789 (1996); Dave Skidmore, IRS Expands Phone Filing for Simple Tax Returns, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at 3 (announcing IRS 's expansion of TeleFile program 
to every state). 
134. See Anne L. Alstot, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 540 n.29 (1995). The Armey Flat Tax 
repeals the EITC and thus further increases the tax burden on low income individuals. 
135. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). 
136. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). 
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income, the need to make the sorts of distinctions now made in many 
section 183 and 262 cases, essentially distinctions between taxable 
consumption and non-taxable business imputs, will not disappear. The 
need for rules that help to make those distinctions means, of course, that 
lawyers and accountants, and those studying to become lawyers and 
accountants, will have to learn the rules, and that somebody will have 
to teach them. 
While the inclusion of only cash wages in the individual tax base is 
an unquestionable simplification, even that dramatic step will not 
eliminate the need for complex distinctions. By incorporating the 
definition of the term wages currently provided by section 3121(a) and 
providing no definition of the term "cash," the Armey Flat Tax imports 
not only the entire employee/independent contractor controversy, one of 
the most intractable problems of the current system, 137 but probably all 
of the case law on what constitutes the receipt of cash under the current 
system as well. 138 Taxpayers and tax return preparers will need to 
understand the doctrines of constructive receipt and assignment of 
income under the Armey Flat Tax, just as they must under the current 
system, 139 and employers and employees will need to know whether 
amounts paid in cash on behalf of employees will be treated as having 
been paid in cash to employees. In addition, since fringe benefits would 
not be deductible to employers but wages and the costs of business 
137. See Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § 63(a)(l)(A) (referring to the definition of 
wages in section 3121(a) of the Code). For a good exploration of the ways in which the 
complexity of current law not only remains but is exacerbated under the Armey Flat Tax, 
see Michael J. Calegari et al., Flat Tax Ramifications For Self-Employed Taxpayers, 72 
TAX NOTES 641 (1996); Lawrence H. Summers, An Evaluation of the Flat Tax, 71 TAX 
NOTES 1555, 1557 (1996). 
138. Since the Armey Flat Tax does not repeal, but only purports to amend, the 
Code, all of the common law that has developed under that statute would presumably 
remain relevant under the Armey Flat Tax, to the extent that the concepts it addresses 
retain their viability. Issues of timing and identity of recipient, while less important 
under a tax system with a flat structure, will not be rendered irrelevant under the Armey 
Flat Tax because that tax contains at least two brackets-a zero bracket and one taxable 
bracket. As long as the system has a zero bracket, the system retains at least some 
avoidance power and taxpayers will have at least some incentive to manipulate the 
timing of the inclusion of income and the identity of its recipients. See Section II.A., 
supra. 
139. Tax teachers need not fear unemployment in the unlikely event that the Armey 
Flat Tax is adopted. During the fall of 1995, I placed copies of the Armey Flat Tax, as 
well as the Nunn-Domenici Tax and several other tax reform proposals, on reserve in 
the Temple Law School library. At the end of every segment of the basic tax course, 
I assigned students the task of going to the library, reading through the text of the 
proposed statutes, and determining whether the issues we had just studied would become 
moot upon adoption of a given proposal. My students were dismayed to discover for 
themselves that few of the issues we covered in the course would be rendered irrelevant 
by adoption of any of the proposals. 
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inputs would be, the need for many of the distinctions that bedevil 
current law will remain. 140 Employees will also have to understand the 
complex relationship between taxes and wages, as they strain to receive 
more non-wage compensation while employers strain to provide less of 
it. 
Many of the most confounding questions of current law will therefore 
remain under the Armey Flat Tax even in the unlikely event that it 
managed to become law in a form that was anything like that of its 
birth. As yet another example, the problems of determining what 
organizations should be exempt from tax, and what portions of their 
income will be so exempt, all will remain under the Armey Flat Tax. 
Indeed, not only does the Armey Flat Tax retain the provisions relating 
to tax exempt organizations, but it adds substantial complexity by 
imposing a separate tax on some of the fringe benefits paid by exempt 
organizations to their employees. 141 
Furthermore, the Armey Flat Tax also provides an entirely new and 
different set of rules for the treatment of income from ":financial 
intermediation services," which it does not bother to define, and the 
income from which will be "equal to the value of the intermediation 
services provided."142 Valuation questions have many characteristics, 
but simplicity is not one of them. 
Failure to define terms and address difficult issues by statute does not 
a simple system make. In its failure to address the many difficult 
definitional and other questions that have arisen under the current system 
140. While section 132 of the Code has made life easier for many tax advisors 
because it has provided answers to many frequently asked questions, its absence, coupled 
with the non-deductibility of fringe benefits and the deductibility of wages, would 
doubtless lead to many controversies regarding whether particular non-cash benefits 
provided by employers to employees should be treated as cash compensation because 
they are paid in cash on the employee's behalf, or as non-cash, because they are not paid 
directly to the employee. 
141. See Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § lOl(b) (amending I.R.C. § 4977 (West 
1996). The likely reason for this is the equalization of the treatment of fringe benefits 
paid by exempt and non-exempt entities. Since non-exempt entities cannot deduct the 
cost of fringe benefits, and cannot otherwise be taxed themselves, the taxation of fringe 
benefits to employees is the only way to provide treatment equivalent to that which 
follows the non-deductibility of such benefits to non-exempts. The taxation of the 
fringes at the employee level could cause exempts to have to pay additional compensa-
tion to tax-effect the taxation of the fringes at the employee level, and that need to 
provide additional compensation would make the provision of fringes as expensive for 
exempts as it would be for non-exempts, and thus equalize their treatment. 
142. See Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § 102(a) (adding section l l(e) to the Code). 
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and that will certainly arise under Armey Flat Tax, the Armey Flat Tax 
is like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand. Proponents of the Armey 
Flat Tax may not want to see the issues, but that will not make the 
issues disappear. Instead, the issues will remain, and they will have to 
be resolved outside of the legislative process. That will have profound 
consequences for tax administration and for the implementation of tax 
policy: Rather than having less power than it does under the current 
system, the Internal Revenue Service might well have more power under 
the Armey Flat Tax. The absence of the constraints imposed by a 
detailed statutory structure and a long history of interpretation might not 
only force the Service to be even more active in interpreting the law and 
providing guidance to taxpayers, but might make it more difficult for 
courts to reject the Service's interpretations. 143 As Frederick Schauer 
has so astutely observed, rules function as allocators of power, and 
decisionmakers constrained by rules have less power than 
decisionmakers not so constrained.144 It follows that decisionmakers 
constrained by few rules have more power than decisionmakers 
constrained by many rules. Ironically, while attempting to simplify the 
tax system and move the Internal Revenue Service farther away from 
people's lives, the Armey Flat Tax might actually increase the agency's 
interpretive power. 
Third, conceptually, the Armey Flat Tax will be even more difficult 
to understand than the current income tax. Because it permits complete 
expensing of business inputs and does not tax income from capital at all, 
the Armey Flat Tax is principally a consumption tax. 145 Nevertheless, 
most of those who will bear the economic burden of the tax will not 
understand that. Not only does the tax proclaim itself to be an income 
tax, but it will be calculated and paid in much the same way as the 
current income tax, thus luring individuals into the misguided belief that 
the biggest difference . between the new tax system and the old is the 
flatness of the rates. That belief is simply wrong. 
143. For an interesting and informative debate on the extent to which courts defer 
to IRS interpretations, see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The 
Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 
637 (1996); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent 
Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1995); Linda. Galler, Emerging Standards for 
Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U .. L. REV. 841 (1992); Linda Galler, 
Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: ff/hat It's All About, 72 TAX NOTES 769 (1996); 
Paul L. Caron, The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 
72 TAX NOTES 359 (1996). For a thorough exploration of judicial constraints on 
regulatory action by administrative agencies, see Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: 
Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996). 
144. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 159 (1991). 
145. THE FLAT TAX, supra note 12, at 40. 
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The biggest difference between the Armey Flat Tax and the current 
system is that one is principally an income tax while the other is not. 
The systems therefore differ dramatically in what they include in the tax 
base. The individual portion of the Armey Flat Tax does not need 
deductions because it does not include very much in the tax base to 
begin with. This technique for defining the tax base (not including, 
rather than including and then deducting) makes it difficult for individu-
als to understand what is being taxed because they have to imagine what 
other amounts might be taxed. Individuals who have only wage income 
will likely know that all of their income is being taxed, but it might not 
be obvious to them that someone who has only income from capital is 
paying no tax at all. By contrast, individuals who have income from 
capital will understand very well that they are not being taxed. Under 
the current system, which excludes items from the tax base by the 
mechanism of deductions, even individuals who cannot utilize the 
deductions tend to know that they are there. They may covet the 
deductions and strive to obtain them, but they know that they exist and 
that knowledge allows them to understand what is, and what is not, 
subject to tax. The very feature of the current law that is so ma-
ligned--its complexity-forces individuals to learn about it and thus to 
understand exactly how much their government is requiring of them, and 
of their neighbor. Under the Armey Flat Tax only consumption will be 
subject to tax, and most individuals will not even know it. 
This feature of the Armey Flat Tax, its ability to tax consumption 
while purporting to tax income, might fit well with our cognitive 
biases, 146 but it is bad tax policy. It is bad tax policy because opaque 
taxes undermine personal autonomy. Those who do not understand how 
they are being taxed are not in a position to opine on the merits of a tax 
system, much less to vote, however indirectly, for it. The Armey Flat 
Tax thus denies individual non-owners of material capital personal 
autonomy in three ways. It provides little avoidance power, no burden 
power, and hides the contours of the very tax system that is imposing its 
burden on them, so that they are unlikely to act to alter or replace it. 
However complex the current system is in application, it is relatively 
straightforward in concept. The Armey Flat Tax strikes precisely the 
opposite balance: It might be relatively simple in application, but it is 
146. See McCaffery, supra note 99, at 13; Geier, supra note 37, at 13. 
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extraordinarily complex in concept. It denies personal autonomy to an 
even greater degree than the current income tax system. It should be 
eschewed for that reason alone. 
For taxpayers, particularly for non-holders of material capital, the 
Armey Flat Tax presents a particularly difficult array of theoretical 
choices. Is the apparent simplicity of the tax--seventeen percent of cash 
wages--worth the loss of personal autonomy that proceeds from the 
absence of avoidance power and the opacity of the tax structure? Is the 
ability to make choices that affect the level of the tax burden (buying a 
house rather than renting, paying alimony rather than child support or a 
property settlement, working more or less), worth the price of having to 
learn about the choices and taking responsibility for them? The answer 
will vary with the degree to which individuals value personal autonomy, 
but the existence of the choice should be made clearer than it has been 
made thus far. 147 
B. The Nunn-Domenici Tax-Choosing to Save 
The Nunn-Domenici Tax is not appreciably simpler than the current 
tax. Not only does it contain somewhat truncated versions of many 
provisions, such as sections 132 and 119, but by providing a deduction 
. for amounts saved, the Nunn-Domenici Tax requires an entirely new set 
of definitional provisions and anti-abuse rules. By distinguishing 
between active business income and return on business investment, the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax also keeps alive many of the definitional issues that 
have fueled the capital gains debate for years. 
Perhaps because it is not simpler, the Nunn-Domenici Tax provides 
more avoidance power than either the Armey Flat Tax or the current 
income tax. For owners of material capital, the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
provides significantly more avoidance power than the current income tax 
and somewhat more burden power as well. For some providers oflabor, 
the Nunn-Domenici Tax provides about the same amount of avoidance 
and burden powers as the current income tax, but for others, specifically, 
those whose labor commands a high price, it provides significantly more. 
147. A look at the current tax system might help to provide the answer for anyone 
inclined to undertake the empirical work because the current tax system contains a 
metaphor for the Arrney Flat Tax: the social security tax. Like the Arrney Flat Tax, the 
social security tax is imposed on cash wages at a flat rate. It is not imposed on returns 
from capital and its economic burden is passed on to the providers of labor. Joel 
Slemrod has recently provided a thorough study of the compliance costs associated with 
various alternative tax systems. Joel Slemrod, Which is the Simplest Tax System of Them 
All?, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 30, at 355. Slemrod's work ties 
compliance costs to complexity. 
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By providing increased avoidance and burden powers to the owners 
of material capital, however, the Nunn-Domenici Tax affirms both the 
value of personal autonomy and the value of the ownership of material 
capital, or of high income from labor that can be converted into material 
capital.· Even though the Nunn-Domenici Tax boasts a progressive rate 
schedule roughly equivalent to that provided by the current system, at 
least before it becomes fully phased in,148 the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
would be less progressive than the current system overall because the 
increased choice holders of material capital receive will reduce their net 
burden. For holders of material capital then, the question whether to 
favor replacement of the current system with the Nunn-Domenici Tax 
has a simple answer. The answer is yes. For low and average income 
labor providers, who typically find it more difficult to convert income 
from labor into material capital, the answer is substantially more 
complicated. 
The Nuim-Domenici Tax will treat all saving in much the same way 
as current law treats saving through employer-sponsored pension plans. 
That is, neither the amount saved nor the return on that amount will be 
taxed to the employee who earns it until withdrawn for consump-
tion.149 While employer-sponsored plans now restrict participants' 
ability to withdraw contributions prior to retiring or attaining a certain 
age, they also provide some advantages over private savings. These 
148. See Nunn-Domenici Tax, supra note 10, § 15. 
149. Under the Armey Flat Tax contributions to retirement plans will not be treated 
as they are treated under current law. Thus, employer contributions to pension plans will 
be deductible to the employer (Armey Flat Tax, supra note 9, § ll(d)(l)(C)) and will 
not constitute income to the employee (id. § 63(a)(l)(A)), but distributions from 
retirement plans will be included in income. Nevertheless, the Armey Flat Tax does not 
present the same choice issues for employees because the Armey Flat Tax retains a 
significant preference for employer-sponsored pension plans. It does this by including 
all cash wages in the tax base, whether saved or consumed. Amounts that might have 
been paid as wages but that are contributed to an employer-sponsored pension plan 
instead will enjoy a tax benefit because they will be excluded from the tax base. 
Exclusion will result in a larger investment because the amount of the compensation will 
not have to be reduced by taxes (either income or payroll) before investment. Thus, 
although the Armey Flat Tax is more favorable to saving than the current system 
because of its failure to tax the return on investment, it is not indifferent as between 
saving through employer sponsored plans or private saving. By contrast, the Nunn-
Domenici Tax is indifferent. Because all amounts· saved are excluded from the tax base, 
private savings will enjoy the same tax advantages (versus consumption) as savings made 
through employer-sponsored plans. For a more detailed discussion of the implication of 
this point, see notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
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advantages include enforced periodicity and protection from the claims 
of creditors. For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that enforced 
periodicity and the benefits of inalienability combine to render employer-
sponsored savings roughly equivalent to private savings outside of the 
tax advantages. Since the tax advantages that now attend employer-
sponsored savings may largely account for their popularity, it is 
important to think through the consequences of withdrawing those 
advantages. 
Employer-sponsored plans are costly to set up and maintain. The 
intricate web of rules developed to prevent their exploitation by 
employers and highly compensated employees has kept thousands of 
lawyers and accountants busy, on both the government and taxpayer 
sides, for many years. While some employer-sponsored plans provide 
substantial immediate benefits to employers whose stock is publicly 
traded (ESOPs, many varieties of stock options, and phantom stock 
plans), 150 and all provide human resources benefits, 151 employers 
150. ESOPs are Employee Stock Ownership Plans, permitted under the current 
Code. I.RC. § 409 (West 1996). They are qualified plans funded with employer 
securities. They provide substantial advantages to employers, not the least of which is 
the knowledge that substantial amounts of stock, the value of which the employer has 
been allowed to deduct, rests in possibly friendly hands. See Michael A. Conte et al., 
Financial Returns of Public ESOP Companies: Investor Effects vs. Manager Effects, 52 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 51 (July-Aug. 1996) (indicating that the presence of an ESOP is a 
good signal to buy the sponsor's stock); Roberta C. Yafie, Pass the 1 OQ, Partner, 17 J. 
Bus. STRATEGY 53 (Jan.- Feb. 1996) (stock options induce employees to think like 
owners) [hereinafter Pass the JOQ]; Anne Beatty, The Cash Flow and Informational 
Effects of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (June 1995); Michael 
A. Conte & Jan Svejnar, Productivity Effects of Worker Participation in Management, 
Profit-Sharing, Worker Ownership of Assets and Unionization in U.S. Firms, 6 INT'L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 139 (1988) (indicating that profit sharing increases productivity) 
[hereinafter Productivity Effect of Worker Participation]; Deidra-Ann Parrish, Sharing 
the Wealth-it's not just good for employees-it's good for business, 12 V ARBUSINESS 
121 (Sept. 15, 1996) (profit sharing plans are an ideal way to reward employees while 
conserving a company's cash) [hereinafter Sharing the Wealth]. Stock options, whether 
incentive stock options permitted by Code section 421A or non-qualified stock options 
taxable under Code section 83, provide similar benefits. See supra, Pass the JOQ; 
Productivity Effects of Work Participation in Management; Sharing the Wealth. 
Phantom stock plans, which provide benefits that track the performance of employer 
stock, allow employers to give employees a financial stake in the performance of the 
business, without having to give up voting control. The benefits that employers receive 
from ESOPs, stock options, and phantom stock plans may make such plans attractive 
candidates for retention even in a world where the tax law does not provide an 
advantage for employer-sponsored and controlled savings over privately controlled and 
directed savings. 
151. Much business literature supports the notion that pension plans provide 
incentives in hiring and retaining workers and in encouraging retirement at suitable time. 
See Edward Lazear, Pensions as Severance Pay, in FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES PENSION SYSTEM 57 (Bodie Zvi & John B. Shoven eds., 1983) (suggesting that 
firms use pensions to encourage retirement at the end of a delayed payment contract); 
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might be less willing to assume the administrative costs of sponsoring 
employee retirement plans in a world where the tax law did not provide 
an advantage for employer-sponsored savings over private savings, and 
thus failed to make such saving particularly attractive. Indeed, 
elimination of the tax advantages of employer-sponsored saving might 
eliminate the human resources advantages as well. Whether it does so 
might depend on employees' willingness to have increased control over 
the decision to save or to consume. 
Employers who sponsor pension plans take amounts that would 
otherwise be paid to employees as wages and instead invest them on the 
employee's behalf, often in vehicles of the employee's choosing, and 
always in ways that inure to the ultimate benefit of the employees. 152 
In a world where employer-sponsored savings receive no tax advantages, 
employer-sponsored plans would lose much of their attractiveness, and 
the human resources advantages that attractiveness begets, if employees 
preferred to control the choice between saving and consuming. 153 In 
Steven G. Allen et al., Pensions, Bonding and Lifetime Jobs, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 463 
(1993) (finding that worker turnover is half as high for workers covered by pensions); 
Robert M. Hutchens, A Test of Lazear 's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts, 5 J. LAB. 
ECON. 5153 (1987) (indicating that pension plans increase worker effort and productivi-
ty); Donald 0. Parsons, Aging and the Employment Contract (Nov. 1988) (unpublished 
manuscript, Ohio State University) (positing that firms use pensions as an inducement 
to retire when worker productivity becomes increasingly variable with age). 
152. Although employers make contributions to employee pension plans in addition 
to paying the employee's salary, pension contributions are more appropriatetly regarded 
as a substitute for additional salary. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW, 27 (1990); Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role 
of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 417, 426 (1994) ("[E]mployees are hired until labor costs ... are equal to the 
workers' marginal product in each period."). 
153. It is interesting to note that employer-sponsored plans existed before such plans 
received any tax advantages because few workers actually incurred much federal income 
tax liabilty, suggesting that they would continue to exist even in the absence of such 
advantages. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 152, at 14-15. Nevertheless, the rising 
importance of the tax advatages that attend employer-sponsored pension plans is 
probably a significant factor in the dramatic growth of such plans. Professors Langbein 
and Wolk report: 
In 1950 pensions held less than 1 percent of all corporate equity; in 1984 they 
held 22.8 percent. In 1950 pensions held 13.1 percent of all corporate bonds; 
in-1984, they held 49.9 percent. [Pension] assets have been growing rapidly 
compared to the economy as a whole: in 1950, pensions held 3 percent of all 
financial assets; in 1984 they held 16.7 percent. 
Id. at 20 (quoting RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC P0LICY123-
24 (1986)). More recently, Engen and Gale report that since the mid-1980's, tax-
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such a world, employer-sponsored savings would remain attractive, and 
would provide the non-tax advantages that would fuel their retention, 
only if employees preferred them for non-tax reasons. 154 Whether 
employees would prefer employer-sponsored savings to private savings 
would depend in large part on employees' attitudes toward the existence 
of choice with respect to the decision whether to save or to con-
sume.155 
C. Values and the Architecture of Tax Reform for Increased Savings 
Attitudes toward the existence of choice are at the core of the tax 
reform debate and provide much of the complexity the reformed tax 
systems would spawn, although they have thus far not been framed as 
such. Both the Nunn-Domenici Tax, which presents the issue of choice 
most starkly, and the Armey Flat Tax, which presents it somewhat more 
obliquely, 156 are, like. all consumption tax proposals, rooted in the 
belief that they will increase the rate of savings in the United States. 157 
That belief proceeds from the unstated assumption that individuals have 
a choice whether to spend or save, and that a tax incentive for saving 
either will cause them to exercise that choice in the direction of saving 
or is necessary to counter the ways in which the tax system disfavors 
saving. 158 Commentators have often noted that only individuals with 
enough disposable income to save can do so and have thus concluded 
preferred savings, which they define to include preferred retirement and life insurance 
savings, has accounted for one hundred percent of personal savings. Eric M. Engen & 
William G. Gale, The Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform on Savings, in FUNDAMENTAL 
TAX REFORM, supra note 30, at 86. 
154. Employer-sponsored plans might give employers significant secondary gains 
from having indirect control over the plan assets. Nevertheless, the requirement that the 
plans be structured as trusts and managed by trustees with fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries of the plan, not to the employer, makes the extent of such gains difficult 
to ascertain or quantify. There are acknowledged non-tax benefits to employer-
sponsored pensions, such as promoting employee bonding to the firm, facilitating the 
departure of older workers (to paraphrase Professors Langbein and Wolk, benefits paid 
by employer-sponsored pension plans serve as the permissible carrot that induces 
retirement, even when the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits the use of 
a stick), providing economies of investment scale and allowing employees to benefit 
from an investment professional's business acumen. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 
152, at 29-31. 
155. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 152, at 31 (suggesting that the forced 
employee savings that result from employer-sponored pension plans may be one of their 
non-tax advantages.) 
156. See supra note 149 for a discussion of choice under the Armey Flat Tax. 
157. See supra note 11 for scholarship on the impetus for flat tax proposals. 
158. BRADFORD, UNEASY COMPROMISE, supra note 28, chap. 10. 
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that consumption taxes are inherently regressive.159 Commentators 
have also debated the extent to which the rate of saving is responsive to 
tax incentives.160 Notwithstanding the amount of scholarship that 
assumes the existence of a choice with respect to the decision whether 
to save or consume (because incentives are irrelevant with respect to 
nondiscretionary outlays), nobody has yet asked whether that is a choice 
that individuals either want or should have. 161 The current tax reform 
debate poses that question starkly. 
· Surprisingly, answering the question is quite difficult because 
determining whether individuals prefer choice is quite complex. 162 
159. For a sampling of recent commentary to this effect, see, e.g., Jonathan Barry 
Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
145, 196 (1996) (outlining arguments for opposition to consumption taxes based on 
regressivity); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty and a Fair Income Tax, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 644 (1996) (discussing regressivity of sales taxes); John S. 
Nolan, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture: The Merit of an Income Tax Versus a 
Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 207, 215 (1995) (explaining regressivity of 
consumption taxes); David G. Raboy, Consumption Tax Preferential Treatment: Poor 
Cure for Regressivity, 72 TAX NOTES 901 (1996) (stating general principle that 
consumption taxes are regressive); Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners?-The Economic 
and Political Inequity of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. 
& Soc. PROBS. 443, 461 (1996) (demonstrating that sales taxes are regressive because 
"they bring into the tax base individuals whose income is so low that it is not even 
taxed"). See also Fullerton & Rogers, supra note 30. 
160. The considerable debate over the desirability of more universally available 
IRAs provides a rich exposure to the debate over the effectiveness of savings incentives. 
For a concise summary of much of the relevant empirical literature, see Steve F. Venti 
& David A. Wise, Government Policy and Personal Retirement Saving, 6 TAX POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 1, 3 (James M. Poterba ed., 1992); see also Daniel Feenberg & 
Jonathan Skinner, Sources of IRA Saving, 3 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 25, 27-29 
(Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1989). Alan Auerbach and Larry Kotlikoffhave examined 
the impact of demographics on the savings rate and have noted that ostensible savings 
incentives, such as IRAs, can sometimes have precisely the opposite effect and have 
typically been removed before their full effects could be studied or detected. Alan J. 
Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving in the 
1980's and Beyond, 4 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 73, 95 (Lawrence H. Summers 
ed., 1990). For a study of the likely effects of tax reform on savings, which concludes 
that the resulting increase be small, see Engen & Gale, supra note 50, at 83. Robert 
Triest concludes that tax reform would probably result in reduced pension coverage and 
that would cause workers to save less for retirement and delay retirement as a result. 
Robert K. Triest, Fundamental Tax Reform and Labor Supply, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX 
REFORM, supra note 30, at 247, 266. 
161. For a glimpse of the level and amount of this scholarship, see supra notes 159-
60. 
162. For an expanded version of this discussion, see Abreu, Taxes, Power, and 
Personal Autonomy, supra note 6, at 50-57. · 
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Making that determination is complex because having choice is 
sometimes good, but sometimes bad. Choice is good to the extent it 
allows individuals to feel empowered. Choice allows the exercise of 
personal autonomy, something Americans generally value. But choice 
carries with it the need to make the choice and to be responsible for its 
consequences. Sometimes people would rather leave decisions to 
someone else. 163 This may be particularly true when the decisions 
involve choosing between present, and therefore certain, comfort, and 
future, and therefore uncertain, comfort. The decision to save or to 
consume presents precisely such a choice. 
For individuals, then, choosing between saving and consuming is 
complex, and choosing who should decide is likewise complex. 
Choosing who should decide requires weighing the value of empower-
ment and personal autonomy against the knowledge that choices made 
by individuals with incomplete information and with the ability to be 
swayed by feelings may result in decisions that may be detrimental to 
the individuals in particular and the economy as a whole in the long run. 
Choosing the tax system that would result from enactment of the Nunn-
Domenici Tax over the current system is therefore complicated by the 
increased choice that the Nunn-Domenici Tax would provide and by the 
difficulty of determining whether that increased choice is a good thing 
for individuals to have. Even if the Nunn-Domenici Tax were simpler 
than the current income tax system (which it is not), it might not be 
more desirable because of the increased complexity of the choices it 
would pose. Even if increased choice were desirable, the Nunn-
Domenici Tax might not be desirable if we felt that those who would 
receive the increased choices---the owners of material capital-should 
not have more choice. That decision can only be made by reference to 
the value placed on the ownership of material capital. 
Virtually all of the foregoing can also be said of the Armey Flat Tax. 
While the Armey Flat Tax would continue to provide a tax incentive for 
saving through employer-sponsored pension plans, the incentive would 
be smaller than that provided under the current income tax system. 
Since all returns on material capital would be exempt from tax under the 
Armey Flat Tax, savings effected through employer-sponsored plans 
would not enjoy a greater rate of return than private savings. The only 
tax incentive for employer-sponsored savings under that system would 
come from the exemption of plan contributions at the time they are 
made. While the existence of a tax incentive for employer-sponsored 
163. See id. for a discussion of the complicated nature of choice that uses the story 
of SOPHIE'S CHOICE as an example. WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979). 
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savings makes the choice between employer-sponsored and private 
savings easier under the Armey Flat Tax than under the Nunn-Domenici 
Tax, the reduced preference makes the choice harder than it is under the 
current income tax. Nevertheless, the choice remains, and it remains 
primarily for those who own material capital directly. 
Economists cannot yet tell us the fate of the employer-sponsored 
pension system under tax reform. 164 Recent work by respected 
economists concludes that "the pension system could face nontrivial 
shrinkage under a wide variety of plausible assumptions . . . [although] 
fears that tax reform will largely eliminate the pension system cannot be 
supported using the parameter estimates in the literature."165 Apparent-
~y, almost none of the simulations that predict dramatic increases in 
savings under a consumption tax account for the existence of tax 
incentives for savings under the current system. The one that does 
suggests that "the reduction in saving due to changes in pensions could 
substantially offset any induced increase in non-pension saving."166 
At this point in the tax reform debate, I do not intend to take sides in 
what promises to be, at minimum, a continuing dispute among econo-
mists. Nevertheless, even at this preliminary stage it is important to 
recognize that consideration of two significant factors appears to be 
missing from all of the simulations and from the ongoing scholarly 
debate. Those factors are the extent to which the various tax reform 
proposals increase the opportunity for the exercise of choice for certain 
classes of taxpayers and the extent to which more or less choice is 
something that those taxpayers want or should have. In other words, the 
debate should include a discussion of the value of choice. 
Isolating choice as an important factor in the policy debate will help 
to untangle a maxim that has achieved the status of near gospel-that 
164. See Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Comprehensive Tax Reform and the 
Private Pension System, 72 TAX NOTES 345 (1996); Jon Newberry, Watch Out for Flat 
Tax Piifalls: Changes could affect insurance coverage, investments, retirement plans, 82 
A.B.A. J. 103 ( 1996) (analyzing these investments under flat tax proposals). In October, 
1996, a Labor Department advisory council called for the establishment of a national 
commision to study the impact of tax policy on the private pension system, and 
specifically, the impact of the various tax reform proposals on employer-sponsored and 
other savings. 1996 BNA DAILY TAX REPORT 199d4 (October 15, 1996). For a good 
analysis of the effect of tax reform on saving generally, see Engen & Gale, supra note 
50. 
165. Id. at 350. 
166. Id. 
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consumption taxes provide an incentive for savings. · The maxim is 
tangled because it assumes that to encourage saving a tax system must 
provide incentives to save for those who hold potential savings directly. 
It thus equates the act of saving with the direct ownership of material 
capital. Yet, as the current tax system has proven so dramatically, the act 
of saving can be performed indirectly, as it is when employers contribute 
amounts to pension plans on their employees' behalf under the current 
system, and still produce substantial total savings. In other words,from 
a desire to increase savings it doesn ~ follow that savings incentives must 
be provided in a way that gives maximum choice to those who hold 
material capital directly. 
The current system provides incentives for savings that have caused 
many to dub it a hybrid income/consumption tax. 167 While the hybrid 
nature of the system has caused its own set of problems, the fact that a 
system with what so many acknowledge to be a consumption tax 
component exists, shows that savings can be increased ( or, put another 
way, that a consumption tax can be adopted), in a way that does not 
involve providing maximum ability to choose to those who own material 
capital directly. Like an income tax, a consumption tax can be designed 
so as to provide great amounts of. choice to those who own material 
capital directly, or it can be designed so as to constrain that choice. The 
Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax are examples of the former 
type of consumption tax. The pension provisions of the current system 
are examples of the latter type. The real question is therefore not 
whether we should adopt a tax system that provides increased incentives 
for saving, but whether we should adopt a tax system that provides 
increased incentives for saving by giving maximum choice to those who 
own material capital directly. It is time to untangle, and separately 
discuss, each of those questions. 
If both an increase in savings and the egalitarian distribution of the 
power to choose were important values, the current tax reform debate 
would look very different from the way it looks now. The discussion 
would be about ways of encouraging employer-sponsored savings even 
more and providing equivalent incentives for the self-employed. That 
the discussion has instead been about ways in which to exempt returns 
on savings for everyone, so that private saving becomes more attractive 
than employer-sponsored saving, reflects not the value of savings, but 
the value of choice for those who hold material capital directly. 
167. See supra note 28 for a discussion of the hybrid nature of the current income 
tax system. 
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Both the Anney Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax allocate 
maximum choice to those who own material capital directly. In doing 
so, both exacerbate the allocation of choice that exists in the current tax 
system. Like the current system, both the Armey Flat Tax and the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax affirm the value of the ownership of material 
capital. If either the Armey Flat Tax or the Nunn-Domenici Tax is 
embraced as the tax system for the next millenium, it should be 
embraced with full awareness of the values that will also be embraced 
thereby, and not under the confused notion that it should be embraced 
because of the value of saving. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Proponents of the Nunn-Domenici Tax and of the Anney Flat Tax 
decry the low rate of savings in the United States and tout the benefits 
that will flow from adopting a tax system that aggressively favors saving 
over consumption. Although each proposal employs a different 
mechanism to achieve its end and neither would result in the enactment 
of a pure consumption tax ( each fails to tax debt- and gift-financed 
consumption), both more closely resemble a consumption tax than does 
the current income tax system. Scholars have pondered whether 
consumption taxes can deliver on their promise of increasing savings 
and, if so, which type of consumption tax would best achieve that 
objective. They have debated the merits of yield exemption and 
consumed income taxes, concluded that one is economically equivalent 
to the other in present value terms, and offered administrative and 
structural reasons to favor one over the other. I have tried to develop a 
different approach. 
I have studied not theoretical structures, but the detailed statutory 
language that would be necessary to put any such system in place and 
that serves as the congressional blueprint for any such change---the text 
of the proposed statutes. I have then sought to determine the extent to 
which the proposals differ from one another and from the current system 
in one important respect: the extent to which they give taxpayers the 
power to choose the level at which they will pay taxes and to determine 
whether they will bear the economic burden of the taxes imposed. The 
results of my inquiry demonstrate that even if yield exemption and 
consumed income taxes are equivalent in present value terms, they differ 
greatly from each other, and from the current system, in the amount of 
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power they give taxpayers, particularly taxpayers who do not own 
material capital directly. While the Armey Flat Tax gives providers of 
labor less power to choose than does the current system, the Nunn-
Domenici Tax gives them more. Under my analysis, the choice among 
the three systems reduces to a decision about the extent to which specific 
taxpayers should have the power to choose the level of their tax liability. 
If too little power is bad, and too much is also bad, the question is how 
much is just right, and for whom. 
The current system may have endured over fourscore and three years 
at least in part because the balance struck by its hybrid nature feels just 
right for many. 168 Despite its many flaws, the current system may 
have withstood the nearly constant criticism hurled at it and the calls for 
fundamental reform that seem to produce significant legislative changes 
at least once every ten years precisely because it reflects fundamental 
values. 169 Those values are the value of material capital and the value 
of personal autonomy. By giving direct owners of capital the greatest 
amount of power to choose the level of their tax liability, the rules that 
make up the current Internal Revenue Code reflect those values. 
168. Although I have focused much of the discussion in this piece, and in my prior 
writing, on the amount of choice provided to owners of material capital, because I 
believe they are the people who receive the largest amount of choice under the current 
system, I do not mean to imply that other, deserving groups .are bereft of choice. Books 
like Steven B. Mendelsohn's TAX OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES (2d ed. 1996), show not only that some taxpayers can exercise choice 
regardless of the ownership of their capital, but that some people value the ability to 
exercise personal autonomy that the current tax system provides. The grant of choice 
to disabled taxpayers, like the provision of choice to the owners of material capital, 
empowers those taxpayers and reflects our values. Insightfully, Mr. Mendelsohn notes 
not only that substantial amounts can be saved by tax planning, but that: 
[M]astery of the tax law [is] an important dimension of the self-help and the 
consumer movements. For those willing and eager to take full responsibility 
for their own destinies, financial planning, of which tax planning is in tum a 
key component, is surely an appropriate place to start. 
STEVEN B. MENDELSOHN, TAX OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES 5 (2d ed. 1996). The disabled would be among the groups who would 
experience reduced opportunities for the exercise of choice under the Armey Flat Tax 
and Nunn-Domenici Tax. Perhaps that is consistent with the other values those 
proposals represent. 
169. It is interesting to note that the years 1966, 1976, and 1986 have each 
produced significant tax legislation, some of which was even labeled "Tax Reform." 
The Foreign Investor's Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) significantly changed the taxation of 
transnational transactions. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 
1520 (codified as amended in ~cattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) brought major, if short-
lived, changes, such as the enactment of carryover basis. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.) broadened the tax base for individuals, repealed the General Utilities doctrine 
for corporations and significantly altered the rate structure. 
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Nevertheless, the veneration of the direct ownership of material capital 
under the current system is not unbridled. Perhaps because of the high 
value placed on the direct ownership of material capital, the system 
contains important provisions that make the accumulation of material 
capital-and the eventual direct ownership thereof-possible for many 
for whom it might not otherwise be so. The pension rules of the current 
system accomplish that objective by encouraging the establishment of a 
private pension system that benefits many whose primary asset is the 
ability to provide labor. The pension system denies providers of labor 
the opportunity to choose whether to consume or save specific amounts. 
In doing so, it adopts a paternalistic approach to savings so that even 
providers of labor can eventually become owners of material capital. 170 
By removing the incentive for employer-sponsored pension plans, the 
Nunn-Domenici Tax (and, to a lesser extent, the Armey Flat Tax) 
removes the paternalism that inheres in the current system, but in doing 
so it changes the distribution of the power to choose. 
Rules, like those that comprise the Internal Revenue Code, function as 
allocators of power. 171 Compared to those of the current system, the 
rules of the Armey Flat Tax would allocate less power to individuals 
who lack material capital and more power to the Internal Revenue 
Service. The rules of the Nunn-Domenici Tax would allocate more 
power to individual holders of material capital, as well as to the Internal 
Revenue Service. Although I regard none of those changes as desirable, 
my objective has not been to argue for retention of the status quo; the 
status quo is far from perfect and there are many changes that I would 
endorse. 172 Rather, my objective has been to expose the allocation of 
power that the proposed changes would effect and thus to move the 
170. Twenty years ago Peter Drucker posited that the growth of pension funds has 
accomplished the objectives of socialism. Peter F. Drucker, Pension Fund Socialism, 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 44 (Win. 1976). Drucker's thesis is that as a result of pensions 
funds "a larger sector of the American economy [(outside of farming)] is owned today 
by the American worker, through his investment agent, the pension fund, than Allende 
in Chile had brought under government ownership to make Chile a 'Socialist country,' 
than Castro's Cuba has actually nationalized, or than had been nationalized in Hungary 
or Poland ... " See also PETER DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION 
FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA 2 (1976). 
171. See, FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 159-62 (1991). 
172. These include changes to features that hide the full level of taxation, such as 
floors and phaseouts (see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 67, 68, 151 (West 1996)), as well as the 
addition of features that would encourage increased savings through business-sponsored 
plans. (I have deliberately not used the phrase "employer-sponsored plans.") 
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debate toward a discussion of the values that such an allocation would 
endorse. What we think about the current crop of tax reform proposals 
depends not on what we think about simplicity and the desirability of 
increased savings but on what we think about the allocation of power. 
A tax system can provide incentives for saving in ways that do not 
allocate power to the direct holders of material capital and high income 
providers of labor and away from low and middle income providers of 
labor. A tax system can also encourage savings through the allocation 
of power exclusively to the direct holders of material capital. The 
Armey Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici Tax would each enact systems 
of the latter type. The current income tax is not such a system, at least 
not exclusively. Since both types of systems can be said to encourage 
savings, the choice between them cannot depend solely on whether we 
want to encourage savings. The choice must instead depend on whether 
we want to encourage savings in ways that reserve increases in power 
to the direct holders of material capital rather than in ways that distribute 
power in different directions. We should discuss the power question 
explicitly. 
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